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I. INTRODUCTION
As a rule, defendants who raise an affirmative defense to a charged
crime do not dispute that they intentionally harmed another person or
property interest, and hence that their conduct satisfied the elements
of the alleged offense. Instead, they offer reasons, in the form of justifi-
cation or excuse, for why they nevertheless should be found not guilty.
Affirmative defenses, including self-defense, necessity, insanity, and
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duress, thus take the form of confession (“I did it”) and avoidance
(“but” additional factors exist that negate guilt). To prevail on an af-
firmative defense, defendants must, at a minimum, satisfy the burden
of producing evidence to put the defense at issue. They often are re-
quired to satisfy the burden of persuasion, as well.
Affirmative defenses may present difficult questions of fact (e.g.,
did the defendant actually believe that her life was in imminent dan-
ger when she shot the deceased?) as well as challenging normative
issues (was her belief reasonable under the circumstances?). Some de-
fendants will be found guilty even though their affirmative defenses
were valid and should have been credited. These unfortunate individ-
uals will have been doubly disadvantaged, if not doubly cursed: first,
by being subjected to the circumstances giving rise to their affirmative
defense (such as being attacked by an unlawful aggressor, or inflicted
with a disabling mental illness); and second, by suffering unjust con-
viction for a crime. And even if their convictions are reversed and their
defense later acknowledged, they may be barred from compensation
despite being punished for a crime they never committed.
This Article examines wrongful convictions that result from the er-
roneous rejection of an affirmative defense. We begin with the premise
that defendants in such cases have indeed been wrongfully convicted,
because they have committed no crime. We describe several cases of
wrongful conviction involving individuals whose affirmative defenses
were rejected at trial. Then, with an eye toward identifying potential
reform measures, we consider evidentiary and doctrinal issues associ-
ated with affirmative defenses, which may contribute to the wrongful
convictions that occur when the defenses are not credited. We con-
clude by examining another injustice often associated with wrongful
convictions resulting from the erroneous rejection of affirmative de-
fenses: proof and other requirements that represent barriers to com-
pensation in these cases.
II. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND FAILED
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Imagine the plight of an innocent person convicted of a crime after
erroneously being identified as the perpetrator by the victim or an
eyewitness. Such cases dominate the list of DNA-based exonerations
maintained by the Innocence Project,1 and proliferate on the National
Registry of Exonerations’s more comprehensive roster of wrongful con-
1. Eyewitness misidentification was a contributing factor in 69% (258/374) of the
DNA-based exonerations identified by the Innocence Project through July 2,
2019. The Cases: Contributing Causes of Conviction, Eyewitness Misidentifica-
tion, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#eyewit
ness-misidentification [https://perma.unl.edu/9VT7-4TYT] (last visited July 2,
2019).
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victions.2 In one such case, for example, Walter Snyder was convicted
of a rape committed in 1985 in Alexandria, Virginia after being identi-
fied by the victim as her assailant, first while he was seated in the
waiting room of a police station, and subsequently in court. Prior to
viewing Snyder in the police station, the victim had been shown a
photo array including his picture, and had noticed him washing his
car across the street from her apartment. Snyder, who consistently
maintained that he knew nothing about the rape, served seven years
of a forty-five-year prison sentence before DNA testing of the vaginal
swab preserved in the case definitively excluded him as the
perpetrator.3
Walter Snyder’s case, like virtually all others in which DNA analy-
sis helped trigger an exoneration, exemplifies a “wrong person” wrong-
ful conviction, in which a crime indeed was committed, but by
someone other than the innocent individual who was erroneously
blamed for it.4 Consider the different circumstances surrounding the
conviction, incarceration, and ultimate vindication of Jacob Gentry.
Gentry was charged with first-degree murder in Sussex County, New
Jersey for the 2008 beating death of David Haulmark. At his 2011
trial, Gentry admitted that he punched, elbowed, and kicked
Haulmark in the head, causing his death. Gentry claimed that he was
defending himself from a violent assault initiated by Haulmark, a for-
mer football linebacker who outweighed him by eighty pounds and
harassed and physically attacked him in the past. The jury acquitted
Gentry of murder but, rejecting his contention that he acted in self-
defense, convicted him of aggravated manslaughter. He was sentenced
to thirty years in prison. Gentry’s conviction was reversed on appeal
because of faulty jury instructions and other errors.5 At his month-
2. The National Registry of Exonerations (NRE) includes both DNA-based and non-
DNA-based exonerations. Through July 2, 2019, mistaken witness identification
was a contributing factor in 703 of the 2,471 (28.5%) cases of wrongful conviction
listed on the NRE. The Cases, Detailed View: Mistaken Witness Identification,
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, bit.ly/32n0qGG [https://perma.unl.edu/AJ9E-
XYSN] (last visited July 2, 2019).
3. See BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS
TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 45–73
(2000); The Cases: Walter Snyder, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocencepro
ject.org/cases/walter-snyder/ [https://perma.unl.edu/DTU8-LN3A] (last visited
Feb. 22, 2019); Snyder v. City of Alexandria, 870 F. Supp. 672, 675–77 (E.D. Va.
1994).
4. See JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D. REDLICH, WRONGFUL CONVICTION: LAW, SCI-
ENCE, AND POLICY 9 (2d ed. 2019).
5. State v. Gentry, 106 A.3d 552 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). The trial judge
instructed the jury that self-defense was a complete defense to murder, but erro-
neously failed to instruct the jury that self-defense also was a complete defense to
manslaughter. In addition, the prosecutor improperly referenced arguably in-
criminating statements attributed to Gentry’s brother, who did not testify and
hence was not subject to cross-examination.
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long retrial in 2016, Gentry again contended that he killed Haulmark
in self-defense. The jury found him not guilty and Gentry, after spend-
ing more than four years in prison, “walked out of the Sussex County
Judicial Complex a free man.”6
Cases like Gentry’s, in which forensic DNA analysis is of no use in
determining guilt or innocence, are absent from the Innocence Pro-
ject’s exoneration list. Indeed, cases involving the erroneous rejection
of an affirmative defense are not “who-dunnits,” rendering evidence of
identity—which is at the heart of “wrong person” wrongful convic-
tions—irrelevant. They instead concern whether “it”—a crime—oc-
curred at all. A great many wrongful convictions eventuate not
because the true perpetrator eluded detection and an innocent person
was erroneously found guilty, but instead arise although a crime was
never committed, which is to say there was no true perpetrator. More
than one-third (910, or 36.8%) of the first 2,471 exonerations identi-
fied on the National Registry of Exonerations are “no crime” cases.7
Such wrongful convictions occur, for example, through prosecutions in
which fires with natural causes are erroneously defined as arson,8 or
6. Joe Carlson, Gentry, Who Once Faced 30 Years, Found Not Guilty on All Counts,
N.J. HERALD (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.njherald.com/article/20160219/ARTI
CLE/302199998# (access through subscription); Jacob Gentry, NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail
.aspx?caseid=5017 [https://perma.unl.edu/6JYE-AY93] (last visited Feb. 22,
2019).
7. The Cases, Detailed View: No Crime, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www
.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={FAF6EDDB-5A
68-4F8F-8A52-2C61F5BF9EA7}&FilterField1=Group&FilterValue1=NC [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/HYZ6-N36Z] (last visited July 2, 2019). A “no crime” case is de-
fined as a case in which “[t]he exoneree was convicted of a crime that did not
occur, either because an accident or a suicide was mistaken for a crime, or be-
cause the exoneree was accused of a fabricated crime that never happened.” Glos-
sary: No Crime, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/speci
al/ exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx#NC [https://perma.unl.edu/3A6W-3WPN]
(last visited Mar. 18, 2019). Nearly half (66/139, or 47.5%) of the exonerations
reported in 2017 on the NRE were “no crime” cases, including sixteen for posses-
sion of drugs, eleven for child sex abuse, and nine for murder. Exonerations in
2017, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.law.umich
.edu/spevcial/ exoneration/Documents/ExonerationsIn2017.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/Y7AT-5HF4].
8. Thirteen “no crime” arson cases were identified on the National Registry of Exon-
erations as of July 2, 2019. See The Cases: No Crime, Arson, NAT’L REGISTRY EX-
ONERATIONS, bit.ly/2HMB9ft [https://perma.unl.edu/2VMX-X2SY] (last visited
July 2, 2019). See generally Jessica S. Henry, Smoke But No Fire: When Innocent
People are Wrongly Convicted of Crimes That Never Happened, 55 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 665, 677 (2018); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, Shifted Science Re-
visited: Percolation Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful Convictions Based on
Outdated Science, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 486–95 (2016); Andrea L. Lewis &
Sara L. Sommervold, Death, But Is It Murder? The Role of Stereotypes and Cul-
tural Perceptions in the Wrongful Convictions of Women, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1035,
1050–52 (2015).
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when a child’s accidental death or death from natural causes is
ascribed to the “shaken baby syndrome” and deemed criminal.9
Perhaps surprisingly, considerable ambiguity surrounds the ap-
propriate definition of a wrongful conviction10 and, in particular,
whether cases that hinge on the rejection or acceptance of an affirma-
tive defense are appropriately classified as wrongful convictions when
a guilty verdict is upset on appeal and the defendant subsequently is
acquitted or otherwise exonerated. There is consensus that, in this
context, wrongful convictions do not encompass cases tainted only by
procedural error (sometimes referred to as “legal innocence,”11) but
rather exclusively concern the conviction of persons who are actually
innocent (or “factually innocent”12) of the charged crime. The crux of
9. Seventeen “no crime” cases involving shaken baby syndrome were identified on
the National Registry of Exonerations as of July 2, 2019. See The Cases, Detailed
View: No Crime, Shaken Baby Syndrome, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, bit.ly/
38SQJSB [https://perma.unl.edu/M5TP-4C4L] (last visited July 2, 2019). See gen-
erally Henry, supra note 8, at 676–77; Plummer & Syed, supra note 8, at 511–18;
Lewis & Sommervold, supra note 8, at 1054–56; Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next
Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1 (2009).
10. See Brad Smith, Marvin Zalman & Angie Kiger, How Justice System Officials
View Wrongful Convictions, 57(5) CRIME & DELINQ. 663, 664 (2011) (“The defini-
tion of a wrongful conviction as the conviction of a factually innocent person
masks the multiple meanings of ‘wrongful conviction’ . . . . [Convictions can be]
wrongful in the factual sense (no crime was committed; the wrong person was
convicted), wrongful in the culpability sense (a person performed the criminal act
but is ‘not culpable, either because of insanity or the absence of some other re-
quired indicium of culpability, usually a particular required mental state,’), and
wrongful in the procedural sense (factually and culpably guilty defendants were
convicted on the basis of constitutional or legal errors but found harmless by
courts).”) (quoting D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Jus-
tified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762
n.2 (2007)); Marvin Zalman, Brad Smith & Angie Kiger, Officials’ Estimates of
the Incidence of “Actual Innocence” Convictions, 25 JUST. Q. 72, 75 (2008)
(“[F]actual or actual innocence . . . is typically thought of as the ‘wrong person’
scenario, where the convicted person did not commit the acts underlying the con-
viction, and was not connected to the crime by a conspiracy or the like. The defini-
tion of wrongful conviction, however, is more complex and no writing to date has
systematically reviewed competing definitions.”).
11. See, e.g., Smith, Zalman & Kiger, supra note 10, at 75 (“Wrongful conviction has
come to mean factual innocence. In law, a wrongful conviction also results from
appellate court reversals based on procedural errors that negate the fair trial
prerequisite of the Constitution. This may be called ‘legal innocence.’”) (footnote
omitted); Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions of
Criminal Justice Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction
and the Extent of Errors, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 436, 449 (2007) (“[O]ur definition
[of wrongful conviction] refers to convicted individuals who are factually inno-
cent. This is in contrast to legal innocence, which includes persons who may or
may not be factually guilty but were nevertheless improperly convicted because
of a prejudicial legal error at trial.”) (citation omitted).
12. Smith, Zalman & Kiger, supra note 10, at 75; Ramsey & Frank, supra note 11, at
449.
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the problem involves the meaning of actual innocence. No one dis-
agrees that “wrong person” cases, such as Walter Snyder’s, and “no
crime” cases in which convictions were obtained although the envi-
sioned harm did not, in fact, occur—such as when the presumed vic-
tim of a criminal homicide turns out to be alive13—are paradigmatic
cases of actual innocence. Much murkier is whether convictions pro-
duced by the erroneous rejection of an affirmative defense qualify as
“no crime” cases of wrongful conviction involving individuals who are
actually innocent.
In their groundbreaking study of miscarriages of justice in poten-
tially capital cases14 in the United States between 1900 and 1985,
13. An early example is the 1819 conviction of Stephen and Jesse Boorn in Vermont
for murdering their brother-in-law, Russell Colvin. Colvin disappeared shortly
after being involved in a heated argument with the Boorns. Years passed before a
relative of the Boorns reported being visited by an apparition which revealed to
him that Colvin had been murdered and his body buried. An investigation discov-
ered bones at the presumed burial site. First Jesse, and later Stephen confessed
to killing Colvin. A jailhouse informant reported that Jesse had described the
killing to him. Both brothers were convicted and sentenced to death following a
jury trial, although Jesse’s sentence later was commuted to life imprisonment.
Publicity regarding the case appeared in New York City newspapers and eventu-
ally resulted in Colvin being found in New Jersey—where he was alive and
well—and enticed to return to Vermont. He appeared just over a month before
Stephen’s scheduled hanging. Both Stephen and Jesse were exonerated following
Colvin’s appearance. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-
FIVE ERRORS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE 14–21 (1932); GERALD W. MCFARLAND, THE
“COUNTERFEIT” MAN: THE TRUE STORY OF THE BOORN/COLVIN MURDER CASE
(1993); Center on Wrongful Convictions, First Wrongful Conviction: Jesse Boorn
and Stephen Boorn, NW. PRITZKER SCH. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/vt/boorn-brothers.html [https://per
ma.unl.edu/D29N-CRD8] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). Other examples of “no
crime” wrongful homicide convictions, in which the ostensible victim had not
been killed, are provided in Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscar-
riages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 42, 64–65
(1987); John D. Bessler, What I Think About When I Think About the Death Pen-
alty, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 782–83 & n.8 (2018).
14. The category of “potentially capital cases” included murder and rape convictions
resulting in death sentences; murder and rape cases in which the death penalty
could have been imposed but was not; cases in which defendants were charged
with capital crimes but were convicted of a lesser included offense (such as first-
degree murder charges resulting in a conviction for second-degree murder); and
criminal homicide cases prosecuted in non-death-penalty states that would have
qualified for capital punishment in a death-penalty jurisdiction. Bedau &
Radelet, supra note 13, at 31–36. More fundamentally, although the great major-
ity (88%) of the 350 cases they identified as involving miscarriages of justice in
potentially capital cases included official recognition of error indicating that an
innocent person had been convicted, they included other cases as well. Id. at
48–49. They explained:
Apart from those few cases where it was later established that no capital
crime was committed, or that the defendant had an ironclad alibi, or that
someone else was incontrovertibly guilty, there is no quantity or quality
of evidence that could be produced that would definitively prove inno-
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Bedau and Radelet adopted what they acknowledged were “relatively
strict criteria”15 for inclusion.
[W]e use the term “miscarriage of justice” to refer only to those cases in which:
(a) The defendant was convicted of homicide or sentenced to death for rape;
and (b) when either (i) no such crime actually occurred, or (ii) the defendant
was legally and physically uninvolved in the crime.16
Referring to Charles Black, Jr.’s lively treatise which explored the va-
garies of death penalty law and practice,17 they elaborated on their
definitional choice. In the process they explicitly excluded cases in-
volving defendants whose affirmative defenses were erroneously
rejected.
As Black observed, the “range of possible ‘mistake’ [in the death penalty’s ap-
plication] is much broader than [is usually supposed].” He identified three
sorts of error—mistake of law and two types of mistake of fact. Black bifur-
cated the latter category into what he called mistake of “gross physical facts”
and mistake of “psychological facts.” As the term is used in this article, mis-
carriage of justice excludes Black’s “mistake of law” and “psychological” er-
rors. This results from our decision to adopt a very broad criterion for
exclusion of cases that might otherwise be considered miscarriages of justice,
as follows: If person A is convicted of killing person B, and A did in fact kill B,
then A is not a victim of miscarriage of justice, even though it is later discov-
ered that A was insane, acted in self-defense, or had some other legally valid
excuse or justification.18
cence. The most one can hope to obtain is a consensus of investigators
after the case reaches its final disposition. Consensus can be measured
in degrees, and the cases that we have included in our catalogue are
those in which we believe a majority of neutral observers, given the evi-
dence at our disposal, would judge the defendant in question to be
innocent.
Id. at 47.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id. (emphasis in original).
17. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981).
18. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13, at 39–40 (quoting BLACK, supra note 17, at 24)
(emphasis in original). Bedau and Radelet’s reliance on Black’s discussion of the
many types of error that plague the death penalty’s administration to exclude
cases involving rejected affirmative defenses from the domain of miscarriages of
justice is perhaps most understandable as a decision to avoid criticism for artifi-
cially enlarging the number of identified miscarriages. See generally Stephen J.
Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-
Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 126–28 (1988); Hugo Adam Bedau &
Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell,
41 STAN. L. REV. 161, 164 (1988). Indeed, Bedau and Radelet characterize the
original conviction and death sentence of Erwin Simants in Nebraska, who was
found not guilty by reason of insanity at his retrial following the reversal of his
convictions on appeal, as “without doubt another miscarriage of justice in a capi-
tal case, but not the type with which we are concerned.” Bedau & Radelet, supra
note 13, at 41. Black considered “psychological” errors to be inevitable and argued
that “the range of possible ‘mistake’ is much broader than” those involving “gross
physical facts” such as: “Did this defendant . . . actually stab the deceased, or did
somebody else do it?” Black continued,
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Others who have grappled with defining wrongful convictions with
an eye toward distinguishing between guilty verdicts marred only by
legal or procedural error, and those involving the factually innocent,
are unclear or do not explicitly address whether defendants who as-
sert affirmative defenses while admitting to the actus reus of a crime
are legitimately classified as actually innocent.19 Some, at a mini-
Having satisfied its mind as to the physical facts, the jury must then
tackle the psychological facts. Did the defendant, who clearly (or admit-
tedly) shot a man while that man was reaching for his handkerchief,
believe that the man was reaching for a gun, or is the pretense that he so
believed mere sham?
BLACK, supra note 17, at 24.
Black argued that the facts that must be determined “extend over a range
both enormously wider and far more difficult than the question ‘Did the defen-
dant kill the deceased?’” Id. at 57. He referred to a
case in which the critical question was not whether the defendant shot
the deceased, which was conceded, but whether the deceased threatened
the defendant with a knife, so that the shooting was in self-defense . . . .
[T]he evidence consisted only of the defendant’s own testimony, plus the
reputation of the deceased for carrying a knife, and the finding of a
knife—which had in the actual case been concealed by the prosecutor!
Quite obviously, a jury can easily make a mistake in a case of that sort.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Black essentially argued that the definitional boundaries of insanity are so ill-
defined that the concept of a mistaken rejection of an insanity defense is virtually
meaningless, but that arbitrary decisions are inevitable. Id. at 59–64. Addressing
the reliability of decisions involving the insanity defense, he asserted:
[I]t is hard to apply the concept of mistake, of rightness or wrongness, to
the application of criteria of the quality we have succeeded in expressing,
criteria which we do not ourselves even pretend to understand. But what
a fearful alternative faces us here! Either mistake is possible as to the
application of such criteria, and therefore extremely likely to occur,
given the quality of the criteria, or else the criteria themselves are quite
meaningless, and mark no line. If the latter is true, then we are execut-
ing some people, and treating others medically, on an irrational basis.
Id. at 62 (emphasis in original) (quoting a lecture he previously delivered).
19. For example, Professor Givelber observed that requiring recognition of error by
criminal justice system officials and “narrowly defining innocence as ‘factual in-
nocence,’ meaning that the defendant was not the perpetrator . . . by implication
leaves out several important categories of convicted innocents, such as those lack-
ing the appropriate mens rea, those possessing a complete defense, and those erro-
neously convicted in an error-free trial.” Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals,
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1317, 1327 (1997) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Poveda’s study of
wrongful convictions focused on “errors that result in the conviction and impris-
onment of innocent persons. These are wrong-person errors . . . .” Tony G. Poveda,
Estimating Wrongful Convictions, 18 JUST. Q. 689, 690 (2001). He continued:
“The tradition of studying wrongful convictions . . . has erred on the side of a
restrictive definition of wrongful conviction: evidence is required showing that
someone else committed the offense or that the convicted person was uninvolved
in the crime.” Id. at 691–92 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). However, “the
concept of innocence can be broadened in a variety of ways including the counting
of accidental killings, self-defense, and killings by a mentally ill offender.” Id. at
692 n.6 (citing Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13, at 106–07).
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mum, are skeptical. Professor Michael Risinger contrasted convictions
that are wrongful “in the factual sense” with those that are wrongful
“in the culpability sense.”20 In the former category are cases in which
“no crime was committed or, more commonly . . . a crime was in fact
committed, but by someone else.”21 The latter category concerns “the
problem of convicting a person who has undoubtedly performed the
actus reus of a crime for which they are not culpable, either because of
insanity or the absence of some other required indicium of culpability,
usually a particular required mental state.”22 In his study estimating
the frequency of wrongful convictions in capital murder-rape cases,
Risinger limited his focus exclusively to “factual innocence,” thereby
excluding “wrongful convictions based on jury misjudgments concern-
ing mens rea, or other normatively charged determinations of the
appropriate level of responsibility, including many affirmative
defenses.”23
While explaining this methodological limitation for his study, Ris-
inger argued that “we are justified in being less concerned (though not
unconcerned) about [wrongful convictions in the culpability sense]
than cases of actual factual innocence.”24 Cases in which the wrong
person has been convicted for a crime committed by someone else in-
volve “brute facts of innocence,”25 and they are “instinctive[ly]”26 more
troublesome than the conviction of people who are innocent only in the
culpability sense. Why is this?
First, if a human clearly does the acts that constitute the actus reus of an
appropriately defined crime, he is, in a sense, properly at the mercy of vagar-
ies of the resolution of those complex, no-one-right-answer, normatively
charged judgments about what was going on in his head. “Errors” regarding
those conclusions are thus just not of the same type or moral magnitude as
errors convicting the wrong person.
Second, given the often explicitly normative nature of the issues in such
cases . . . a legitimate outcome is best served by allowing partisan attempts at
normative contextualization on both sides. Whatever judgment the jury there-
after makes concerning the level of [a defendant’s] responsibility, if any,
seems legitimate and acceptable.27




24. Id. (citing D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Stan-
dards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV.
1281, 1298–1307 (2004)).
25. Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts, supra note 24, at 1298 (quoting D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on
the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 114 (2000)).
26. Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts, supra note 24, at 1299.
27. Id. at 1299–1300 (footnotes omitted).
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Risinger does not appear to be alone in adopting this position.28
Yet the premises are tenuous, and the conclusions disputable if not
28. See George C. Thomas III, Where Have All the Innocents Gone?, 60 ARIZ. L. REV.
865, 870 (2018) (describing cases that “can never fit the classic wrongful convic-
tion model”) (citing Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts, supra note 24, at 1295–1307).
Thomas points to instances
where the defendant admits the act but asserts a defense or claims that
his mens rea did not meet the statutory standard. For example, X admits
that he killed Y but claims justification or that his mens rea was less
than required by the homicide statute. It makes no sense to speak of
wrongful convictions here. The fact finder’s judgment on the affirmative
defense or the mens rea issue is the received truth; that a different fact
finder might have reached the opposite conclusion does not mean that
the first one was false.
Id.
See generally Larry Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the
Error Pattern in Criminal Prosecutions by “Empiricizing” the Rules of Criminal
Law and Taking False Acquittals and Serial Offenders Seriously, 48 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1243, 1251 (2018) (“Nor are many people disturbed by the fact that in
many states . . . a defendant who presents a so-called affirmative defense can be
rebutted and then convicted provided the state can show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant’s exculpatory evidence is probably false.”). Some
other commentators appear to conflate affirmative defense issues and issues of
mens rea. See, e.g., Cathleen Burnett, Constructions of Innocence, 70 UMKC L.
REV. 971, 979–80 (2002) (“Legal innocence could be invoked when the defendant
admits that he killed the victim, but offers an excuse or a justification that ne-
gates the deliberateness and intentionality of the action. Since the defendant ad-
mits to killing the victim, the burden of proof shifts to him to prove his theory of
action. The contention is that without mens rea, a conviction for first degree mur-
der is inappropriate. There are two situations that will be covered under this . . .
type of innocence, both of which make use of affirmative defenses: self-defense,
and mental capacity or state of mind.”); Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13, at 40
(“Killing in self-defense is, of course, only one of several subcategories of homicide
in which the mens rea of murder is absent.”) (footnote omitted). As a formal mat-
ter, the prosecution must affirmatively prove the mens rea element of a crime to
establish guilt, and a defendant who asserts an affirmative defense such as self-
defense or insanity typically will have acted intentionally or purposely, i.e., the
requisite mens rea to support a conviction. Affirmative defenses may negate cul-
pability, even though the defendant acted with the mens rea that is an element of
the crime. See id. at 40, n.90 (citing GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 398–400 (1978)). Perhaps for reasons owing more to pragmatic difficulties
than conceptual disagreement with claims of innocence based on rejected affirma-
tive defenses, some innocence organizations will not take on cases in which con-
victed individuals assert that their affirmative defense was wrongly rejected. See,
e.g., Submit a Case, CENTURION MINISTRIES, https://centurion.org/submit-a-case/
[https://perma.unl.edu/M8R5-94DA] (last visited June 14, 2019) (“We do not take
on accidental death, self-defense cases, or cases where the defendant had any
involvement whatsoever in the crime for which he/she was convicted.”); Submit a
Case, MIDWEST INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://themip.org/submit-a-case/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/DSG6-QXHL] (last visited June 14, 2019) (“We do NOT accept
cases with claims of self-defense, intoxication, insanity, or consensual sex.”) (em-
phasis in original); WIP Legal Assistance, WIS. INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://
law.wisc.edu/fjr/clinicals/ip/representation.html [https://perma.unl.edu/DMK6-
KHV3 ] (last visited June 14, 2019) (“We cannot offer help if any of the following
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untenable when applied to a great many cases in which individuals
are convicted of crimes after their valid affirmative defenses are not
credited. The difficulties are most clearly apparent when the rejected
defense is in the justification family rather than taking the form of an
excuse. Conduct that otherwise would be criminal is justified, and
hence lawful, when necessary to prevent a harm of greater magnitude
than the harm generally proscribed by the criminal law.29 The actor
who chooses the “lesser evil” to avert a greater one from ensuing is
recognized as having engaged in the socially approved course of ac-
tion.30 Excuse defenses have a different grounding. They are recog-
nized when actors confront disabilities which negate
blameworthiness, thus making their condemnation and punishment
by operation of the criminal law inappropriate. Unlike with justifica-
tion defenses, the acts committed and the resulting harms continue to
be disapproved and are lamented. Actors are excused from criminal
responsibility because the requisite culpability for punishment is lack-
ing.31 Although the classification of justification and excuse defenses
are true: . . . You acted in self-defense[;] You claim an affirmative defense such as
insanity, intoxication, provocation . . . .”).
29. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 199, 216–17 (1982) (“All justification defenses have the same internal struc-
ture: triggering conditions permit a necessary and proportional response. The
triggering conditions are the circumstances which must exist before the actor will
be eligible to act under a justification . . . . The triggering conditions of a justifica-
tion defense do not in themselves give the actor the privilege to act without re-
striction. To be justified, the response conduct must satisfy two requirements:
(1) it must be necessary to protect or further the interest at stake, and (2) it must
cause only a harm that is proportional, or reasonable in relation to the harm
threatened or the interest to be furthered.”).
30. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL
LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 32–33 (2006); FLETCHER, RE-
THINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 28, at 774–98 (1978); Robinson, supra note
29, at 214; Chunlin Leonhard, Illegal Agreements and the Lesser Evil Principle,
64 CATH. U. L. REV. 833, 841 (2015).
31. Robinson, supra note 29, at 229 (“Justified conduct is correct behavior which is
encouraged or at least tolerated. In determining whether conduct is justified, the
focus is on the act, not the actor. An excuse represents a legal conclusion that the
conduct is wrong, undesirable, but that criminal liability is inappropriate because
some characteristic of the actor vitiates society’s desire to punish him. Excuses do
not destroy blame . . . ; rather, they shift it from the actor to the excusing condi-
tions. The focus is on the actor. Acts are justified; actors are excused.”) (footnote
omitted); Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What
They Are, and What They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 726 (2004)
(“Justification defenses focus on the act and not the actor—they exculpate other-
wise criminal conduct because it benefits society, or because the conduct is in
some other way judged to be socially useful. Excuse defenses focus on the actor
and not the act—they exculpate even though an actor’s conduct may have
harmed society because the actor, for whatever reason, is not judged to be blame-
worthy.”) (footnotes omitted); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
218–19 (4th ed. 2006).
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is not always airtight,32 self-defense, defense of others, defense of
property, and necessity commonly are considered to conform to the
justification framework.33 Insanity, duress, and infancy (or tender
years) are among the defenses typically recognized as excuses.34
We believe that individuals found guilty of crimes after their valid
affirmative defenses are rejected have been wrongfully convicted and,
moreover, that the miscarriages of justice in these cases are every bit
as pronounced as in “wrong person” and other “no crime” wrongful
convictions.35 Indeed, convicting and punishing a person who, for ex-
ample, had to kill or be killed while warding off an unlawful imminent
lethal assault, or who drowned a child in obedience to a psychosis-
induced deific command delusion, arguably would compound the in-
justice inhering in other cases of wrongful conviction. Such individuals
can fairly be characterized as doubly victimized: first by the altogether
unwelcome circumstances precipitating their action (a life-threaten-
ing attack, or suffering serious mental illness), and then by the mal-
functioning of the criminal justice system in discounting those
circumstances, rejecting their lawful defenses, branding them as
criminals, and punishing them.
32. For instance, duress “straddles the line between an excuse and a justification”
and is not recognized uniformly as either type of defense in different jurisdic-
tions. Madeline Engel, Unweaving the Dixon Blanket Rule: Flexible Treatment to
Protect the Morally Innocent, 87 OR. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (2009); Marcia Baron,
Justifications and Excuses, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 387, 389 (2005). Likewise, self-
defense based on mistaken facts is sometimes considered to be an excuse, and
sometimes a form of justification. See Reid Griffith Fontaine, An Attack on Self-
Defense, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57 (2010); Kyron Huigens, The Continuity of Justi-
fication Defenses, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 627 (2009). In addition, affirmative de-
fenses, which defendants often have the burden of establishing, are distinct from
elements of the crime (such as mens rea, for example, which may be at issue in
mistake-of-fact cases), which the prosecution of course must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, supra note 30, at
208 (“A line of [U.S. Supreme Court] cases from the 1970s indicates that the gov-
ernment must bear the burden of persuasion for any issue defined as an offense
element—though importantly, the cases do not impose such a requirement for
issues characterized as ‘defenses’ or ‘mitigations.’”).
33. Milhizer, supra note 31, at 812–16; Robinson, supra note 29, at 214–16.
34. Milhizer, supra note 31, at 816–20; Robinson, supra note 29, at 223–29. With
respect to the infancy defense, see generally Craig S. Lerner, Originalism and the
Common Law Infancy Defense, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1577, 1586–87 (2018); Francis
Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1007–10 (1932).
35. See Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassess-
ing the Conventional Wisdom About the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60
ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 819–20 (2018) (while limiting the focus of his article to “wrong
person” and “no crime” cases of actual innocence, Professor Cassell observed: “To
be sure, situations where a defendant presents a legal claim (e.g., self-defense)
that the jury mistakenly rejects are tragedies in their own right—and ‘wrongful
convictions’ in some general, moral sense.”) (footnote omitted).
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In the following section we identify several individuals who were
convicted of crimes after their affirmative defenses were rejected, only
to be subsequently exonerated. Of course, an exoneration36 does not
invariably signify factual innocence.37 The inexact correspondence be-
tween an exoneration and actual innocence is not unique to cases that
hinge on the acceptance or rejection of affirmative defenses. Whatever
ambiguities attach to exonerations in cases involving affirmative de-
fenses should not undermine the conclusion that the erroneous rejec-
tion of a meritorious affirmative defense represents a fundamental
36. The National Registry of Exonerations defines the terms “exoneration” and “ex-
oneree” as follows:
Exoneration—A person has been exonerated if he or she was convicted
of a crime and, following a post-conviction re-examination of the evi-
dence in the case, was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a
government official or agency with the authority to make that declara-
tion; or (2) relieved of all the consequences of the criminal conviction by a
government official or body with the authority to take that action. The
official action may be: (i) a complete pardon by a governor or other com-
petent authority, whether or not the pardon is designated as based on
innocence; (ii) an acquittal of all charges factually related to the crime
for which the person was originally convicted; or (iii) a dismissal of all
charges related to the crime for which the person was originally con-
victed, by a court or by a prosecutor with the authority to enter that
dismissal. The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result,
at least in part, of evidence of innocence that either (i) was not presented
at the trial at which the person was convicted; or (ii) if the person pled
guilty, was not known to the defendant and the defense attorney, and to
the court, at the time the plea was entered. The evidence of innocence
need not be an explicit basis for the official action that exonerated the
person. A person who otherwise qualifies has not been exonerated if
there is unexplained physical evidence of that person’s guilt.
Exoneree—A person who was convicted of a crime and later officially
declared innocent of that crime, or relieved of all legal consequences of
the conviction because evidence of innocence that was not presented at
trial required reconsideration of the case.
Glossary, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ex
oneration/Pages/glossary.aspx#NC [https://perma.unl.edu/VLP2-KLPQ] (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2019) (emphasis in original). See also Keith A. Findley, Defining
Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1162, 1184–85 (2010–2011) (providing standard
definition of “exoneration” and contrasting this definition with the narrower
meaning of “innocent”).
37. See, e.g., Daniel H. Benson, Hans Hansen & Peter Westfall, Executing the Inno-
cent, 3 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 9 (2013) (“Exonerations are the
few cases out of the many, many wrongful convictions that are rectified and in
which defendants are granted some type of relief. For the purposes of this article,
we do not take exoneration as an indication of innocence. It is a necessary, but
not sufficient, criteria [sic] to be included in our count of ‘actual innocents.’ For
example, even though a defendant was exonerated, prosecutors might not have
pursued retrial for a myriad of reasons, making a hard decision to instead dis-
miss the charges. Sometimes, key witnesses are no longer willing to testify, mak-
ing it almost impossible for prosecutors to retry the case. For these reasons, we do
not simply count ‘exonerated’ as innocent.”); Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Inno-
cence, 95 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 508 (2005).
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miscarriage of justice involving a person who, in the eyes of the law,
has not committed a crime.
III. WHEN REJECTED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES PRODUCE
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: CASE STUDIES
A. Exonerations in the Wake of Rejected Justification
Defenses
Narcisse Antoine. Narcisse Antoine shot and killed Brandon Ham-
mond and wounded Jeffrey Thompson during a 2009 pre-dawn affray
in the parking lot of a West Palm Beach, Florida nightclub. Hammond
and Thompson had been ejected from the nightclub after repeatedly
harassing patrons. The two men were haranguing a group in the park-
ing lot when Antoine exited the establishment and attempted to inter-
cede as a peacemaker. Thompson and Hammond responded with
profanity and racial slurs, followed by Hammond’s punching Antoine
in the jaw. At that point, Antoine drew a pistol and told the men to
leave. When Hammond reached into his pants or shirt, Antoine shot
him multiple times, claiming he was afraid that Hammond was re-
trieving a gun. He then shot Thompson, asserting that he feared
Thompson was reaching for a gun while advancing on him. Antoine
was charged with murdering Hammond and with the attempted mur-
der of Thompson. He pled not guilty at his 2011 trial, contending that
he acted in self-defense. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
murder charge but convicted Antoine of attempting to murder Thomp-
son. Antoine was sentenced to twenty-five to forty years
imprisonment.38
On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal ruled that the trial
judge erred in declining to instruct the jury that Hammond’s reputa-
tion for violence could be considered relevant to the self-defense claim
even if Antoine was unaware of it.39 Two trial witnesses, both bounc-
38. Antoine v. State, 138 So. 3d 1064, 1067–72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Narcisse
Antoine, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exon
eration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4681 [https://perma.unl.edu/V2K2-KD37]
(last visited Apr. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Narcisse Antoine]. The appellate court
subsequently ruled that Antoine’s sentence exceeded the maximum of twenty-five
to thirty years permitted by Florida law. Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1077–78.
39. Over objection, the trial court relied on a Florida Standard Jury Instruction to
charge the jury:
If you find that Brandon C. Hammond had a reputation of being a vio-
lent and dangerous person, and that their [sic] reputation was known to
the defendant, you may consider the fact in determining whether the ac-
tions of the defendant were those of a reasonable person in dealing with
an individual of that reputation.
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1072 (emphasis added). The appellate court explained that
the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s reputation for violence may be required
when relevant to the defendant’s reasonable belief that it was necessary to use
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ers at the club where the night’s events began, testified that Ham-
mond had a reputation for violence.40 The appellate court concluded
that although the reputation testimony was limited to Hamilton,
Thompson had “acted in concert” with Hamilton, which could help “ex-
plain why [Antoine] felt apprehensive regarding Thompson’s con-
duct”41 as well. Antoine was awarded a new trial. The prosecution
revived the murder charge against Hammond, which resulted in a
hung jury at the original trial, in addition to the attempted murder
charge against Thompson. At his 2015 retrial, Antoine again claimed
that he shot the men in self-defense. After deliberating for more than
eleven hours, the jury found Antoine not guilty of both charges.42
Jacob Cash. Jacob Cash claimed that he shot and killed Willie
McCloud, a hitchhiker he picked up in Ybor City, Florida, while de-
fending against McCloud’s attempted carjacking. Law enforcement
authorities maintained that Cash stole the car he was driving and
shot McCloud in a dispute over drugs. Hillsborough County prosecu-
tors charged Cash with second-degree murder and shooting into a ve-
hicle. Jeremy Fields, an employee at the automotive dealer that
owned the car Cash was driving, testified at Cash’s 1998 trial that
Cash indeed stole the car. A detective testified that bullet cartridges
were found outside of the vehicle, suggesting that, contrary to Cash’s
trial testimony, Cash was not inside the car and attempting to climb
out the window to escape an attempted carjacking when he fired his
gun. Cash further denied that he stole the car, claiming that Fields
loaned him the vehicle.43 The jury found Cash guilty and the trial
judge imposed a fifty-year prison sentence for the murder conviction.
That sentence was vacated on appeal because it exceeded the gov-
erning guidelines without written justification.44
After the case was remanded for resentencing, the Florida District
Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hear-
ing on Cash’s post-conviction allegations that Fields lied when he tes-
tified that Cash stole the car and that the prosecutor knew that the
testimony was false. These claims were supported by the sworn affida-
vit of the owner of the automotive dealer where Fields had been em-
defensive force, but it was not necessary concerning whether the victim was the
unlawful aggressor. Id. at 1075–76.
40. Id. at 1072.
41. Id. at 1076.
42. Marc Freedman, Man Acquitted of Murder, Attempted Murder in Double Shoot-
ing, SOUTH FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/lo
cal/palm-beach/boynton-beach/fl-shooting-death-acquittal-20150424-story.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/GB5U-FC6S]; Narcisse Antoine, supra note 38.
43. Jacob Cash, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3093 [https://perma.unl.edu/AJJ8-
XG5F] (last visited Apr. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Jacob Cash]; Cash v. State, 875
So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
44. Cash v. State, 779 So. 2d 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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ployed. The appellate court additionally directed a hearing on Cash’s
allegation that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by
failing to request a self-defense instruction for carjacking rather than
for aggravated battery.45 Cash was granted a new trial, which took
place in 2008, ten years after his original trial and conviction. He
again maintained that he shot McCloud to defend against the at-
tempted carjacking. His lawyer presented evidence that Cash was left-
handed, thus offering an explanation for why the spent cartridges
were found outside of the car that was consistent with Cash’s claim
that he was inside of the vehicle when he discharged his gun. The jury
found Cash not guilty and he was released from custody.46
Anthony Chambers. In February 2008, Anthony Chambers stabbed
Edward Quiles in the neck, causing his death, during an altercation in
an apartment in the South End section of Boston. The fight capped
“eighteen hours of close-quartered and drug-soaked friction.”47 It
erupted after Quiles was unable to locate a bag of heroin and accused
Chambers of taking it, which Chambers denied. Chambers’s 911 call
to report that Quiles was threatening to kill him included background
noise of the attack. Chambers later told the police that Quiles swung
at him, threw him on a bed, pulled out a knife, and tried to stab him.
Chambers claimed that he defended himself by pushing back Quiles’s
hand, resulting in Quiles being stabbed. Chambers was arrested and
charged with manslaughter.48
To support Chambers’s justification defense, Chambers’s attorney
announced during his opening argument at trial that he would call a
witness to testify about Quiles’s prior violent conduct. Under Massa-
chusetts law such evidence was admissible to help substantiate that
the victim was the initial aggressor in cases in which self-defense was
raised.49 Although the trial judge ruled at the outset of the trial that
Chambers’s witness would be allowed to offer such testimony, she
later excluded it because the evidence was uncontroverted that Quiles
was the initial aggressor in the fight with Chambers.50 At the end of
the five-day trial, the jury convicted Chambers of involuntary man-
slaughter and he was sentenced to five to seven years in prison.51 The
Massachusetts Court of Appeals affirmed Chambers’s conviction in
45. Cash, 875 So. 2d at 829.
46. Jacob Cash, supra note 43.
47. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 966 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012), rev’d,
989 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 2013).
48. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 989 N.E.2d 483, 486–89 (Mass. 2013).
49. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2005).
50. Chambers, 989 N.E.2d at 485, 489.
51. Id.; Anthony Chambers, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich
.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4985 [https://perma.unl
.edu/NEW7-MJC2] (last visited Apr. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Anthony Chambers].
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201252 but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the following year
and remanded for a new trial, ruling that the excluded evidence was
admissible53 and that the error was especially prejudicial because de-
fense counsel was precluded from fulfilling his promise to the jury that
he would present testimony from a witness to help demonstrate
Quiles’s propensity for violence.54 Chambers was released from cus-
tody on bond in late 2013 and was acquitted at his 2014 retrial.55
Gabriel Drennen. While moving out of the Riverton, Wyoming mo-
bile home in May 2010 that he rented from Gabriel Drennen, Leroy
Hoster sought access to tools he stored in a locked storage unit that
Drennen owned. Hoster needed the tools to change a flat tire on his
car. Drennen refused to help and the men exchanged words. After
Hoster and his friend Michael Adams returned to the trailer, Drennen
approached carrying “No Trespassing” signs and tape, with a gun hol-
stered on his hip. Further words were exchanged and Hoster, infuri-
ated, “grabbed [Drennen], and threw him from the porch over a three
to four foot high fence into the yard.”56 Drennen landed on his back
and tried to slide backward as Hoster began climbing the fence and,
according to Drennen, threatened to kill him. Drennen thereupon
fired five shots at Hoster, striking him four times. Drennen then
pointed his gun at Adams, who was standing behind Hoster’s car.
Drennen and Adams each called 911 and attempted to minister to
Hoster, who died from his wounds after being taken to a hospital.
Drennen was arrested and charged with the first-degree murder of
Hoster and with aggravated assault and battery for pointing his gun
at Adams.57 Drennen claimed he acted in self-defense.
The prosecutors at Drennen’s 2011 trial represented to the jury,
during both their opening statements and closing arguments, that
52. Chambers, 966 N.E.2d at 824.
53. Chambers, 989 N.E.2d at 490–91 (“Where a victim’s prior act or acts of violence
demonstrate a propensity for violence, we conclude that Adjutant evidence is as
relevant to the issue of who initiated the use or threat of deadly force as it is to
the issue of who initiated an earlier nondeadly assault, and such evidence may be
admitted to assist the jury where either issue is in dispute, because the resolution
of both issues may assist the jury in deciding whether the prosecution has met its
burden of proving that the defendant did not act in self-defense.”) (emphasis in
original).
54. Id. at 492–95.
55. Anthony Chambers, supra note 51.
56. Drennen v. State, 311 P.3d 116, 121 (Wyo. 2013).
57. Id.; Associated Press, Riverton Police: Landlord-Tenant Dispute Led to Shooting,
BILLINGS GAZETTE (May 6, 2010), bit.ly/2SR5HDd [https://perma.unl.edu/R2GU-
XRE6]; Megan Cassidy, Fremont County, Wyoming, Attorney Moves to Dismiss
Charges in Homicide Case, CASPER STAR-TRIB. (Dec. 20, 2013), bit.ly/2wEKP9y
[https://perma.unl.edu/2Z2X-MK9S]; Gabriel Drennen, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERA-
TIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?
caseid=4335 [https://perma.unl.edu/2PCC-QMB6] (last visited Apr. 23, 2019)
[hereinafter Gabriel Drennen].
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Drennen’s actions could not be justified as self-defense because Hoster
was unarmed when he was shot. One prosecutor asked the jury in his
closing argument to “return with a verdict of guilty, because you see:
in the state of Wyoming, there is a law against shooting an unarmed
man.”58 The other argued that Drennen “didn’t know the law. He
thinks he’s justified. He thinks he can shoot and kill someone even
though they are unarmed.”59 Drennen was found guilty of both
charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for Hoster’s murder
and ten years for the aggravated assault and battery against
Adams.60
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the prosecutors
committed plain error by misrepresenting that the law flatly prohib-
ited shooting an unarmed person in self-defense. The court explained
that whether the victim was armed when shot may be relevant to
whether the defendant acted reasonably when using deadly force in
ostensible self-defense, but it is not determinative. Rather, the jury
must consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing the rea-
sonableness of both the defendant’s perception that he was threatened
with immediate bodily injury and the manner in which he defended
himself.61 The court concluded that the murder and the aggravated
assault and battery convictions were both “tainted,”62 and granted
Drennen a new trial. Following the remand, the county attorney—who
did not prosecute the charges originally—dismissed both counts, ex-
plaining that his review of the case “shows a prosecution based on dis-
regard for the evidence, the law, and this office’s commitment to
justice.”63
58. Drennen, 311 P.3d at 122. Similar assertions were made during the opening
statement and closing arguments. Id. In addition, when Drennen’s attorney said
during his opening statement, “There’s nothing in the law that says you can’t
shoot an unarmed man,” one prosecutor objected, asserting, “That is improper at
this point to make a statement like that and I would submit it’s a misstatement
of the law.” Without directly ruling on the objection, the trial judge simply stated,
“Let’s move on, counsel.” Id. at 123.
59. Id. at 122.
60. Id. at 121.
61. Id. at 122. Under Wyoming law, “[t]he defendant has an initial burden of making
a prima facie case that he acted in self-defense; however, once that minimal bur-
den is satisfied, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” Id. at 124–25.
62. Id. at 124.
63. Cassidy, supra note 57 (quoting Fremont County Attorney H. Michael Bennett’s
media release). Bennett cited two factors as being “crucial” to the decision to dis-
miss the charges against Drennen. First, forensic evidence indicated that Dren-
nen and Hoster “were in very close proximity to one another when the shots were
fired,” thus preventing Drennen from escaping Hoster’s aggressive charge. Addi-
tionally, Drennen’s firing multiple shots at Hoster was not inconsistent with a
claim of self-defense because “[e]xperts say that humans are wired to continue to
shoot until the threat is neutralized.” Id.
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Harold Fish. While hiking in a National Forest near Strawberry,
Arizona in May 2004, fifty-seven-year-old Harold Fish, a retired high
school teacher, observed a man some thirty yards ahead lying on the
ground alongside the foot trail. With the man—forty-three-year-old
Grant Kuenzli—were three sizeable unleashed dogs, two of which
charged toward Fish, growling and barking. Fish yelled in an attempt
to get Kuenzli to control the dogs. When Kuenzli took no action and
the dogs advanced to within a few feet of him, Fish fired a warning
shot into the ground from the semiautomatic handgun he was carry-
ing. The shot caused the dogs to veer to the side of the trail. Kuenzli
proceeded to rush toward Fish “with his eyes crossed and looking
crazy and enraged, cursing at [Fish] and yelling that he was going to
hurt” him.64 Fish warned Kuenzli to leave him alone and to stop or he
would shoot, but Kuenzli “continued to race toward him, accelerating,
yelling profanities and swinging his arms.”65 With Kuenzli within five
to eight feet of him, and the dogs still to his side and thus constraining
his movement, Fish shot Kuenzli three times in the chest. Fish placed
his backpack under Kuenzli’s head, covered him with a tarp, and then
walked to a nearby road and asked a passing motorist to summon
help. Paramedics soon arrived but Kuenzli had already died.66
Fish was charged with second-degree murder. He pled not guilty,
claiming he acted in self-defense. The shooting generated national at-
tention. As described in an NBC Dateline broadcast, “Dog lovers were
pitted against gun lovers. [The case] fueled the debate on gun control
versus self control. The National Rifle Association even got involved,
partially sponsoring Harold Fish’s defense fund.”67 At his trial, Fish
sought to introduce testimony from several witnesses about similar
encounters they had with Kuenzli and his dogs along the hiking trail,
specifically that Kuenzli become enraged and acted erratically and ag-
gressively, frequently involving confrontations concerning his dogs.
Although the trial court admitted evidence regarding Kuenzli’s gen-
eral reputation for violence, it excluded testimony about the specific
acts of violence witnesses were prepared to describe, reasoning that
such testimony was irrelevant because Fish lacked personal knowl-
edge of the prior violent acts.68
64. State v. Fish, 213 P.3d 258, 262 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009), appeal denied; Harold Fish,
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4266 [https://perma.unl.edu/MS7U-KM33] (last
visited Apr. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Harold Fish].
65. Fish, 213 P.3d at 262.
66. Id.
67. John Larson, Trail of Evidence, NBC DATELINE (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.nbc
news.com/id/15199221/ns/dateline_nbc-crime_reports/t/trail-evidence/#.XMHeg
dh7kkI [https://perma.unl.edu/5645-HLB5].
68. Fish, 213 P.3d at 263–64.
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In 2004, when Fish shot Kuenzli, Arizona law required defendants
to persuade the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that they ac-
ted in justifiable self-defense.69 Owing in part to the interest gener-
ated by Fish’s case, the law was changed in 2006 to require the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not act in self-defense under designated circumstances, including de-
fense against aggravated assault.70 Although Fish’s trial was in pro-
gress when this revision took effect, the new law did not apply
retroactively to his case.71 The trial jury heard fifteen days of testi-
mony. During deliberations, the jury asked the judge to define “at-
tack” as used in a portion of the self-defense instructions, but the
judge declined to explain that an “unlawful attack” under Arizona law
subsumed the offense of aggravated assault, which does not require a
physical touching.72 The jury ultimately found Fish guilty of second-
degree murder and he was sentenced to ten years in prison.73
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. It instructed the trial court
to consider on remand whether testimony concerning Kuenzli’s prior
violent acts was admissible. Even though Fish lacked knowledge of
the prior conduct at the time of their confrontation, his account of
Kuenzli’s actions, made immediately after the shooting, so closely mir-
rored the description others gave that the evidence was logically rele-
vant as bearing on Fish’s credibility.74 The appellate court further
determined that the trial court’s failure to define aggravated assault
when it instructed the jury on the law of self-defense when a defen-
dant is subjected to unlawful attack was reversible error.75 Citing “a
lack of evidence and witnesses to the shooting,”76 the prosecution de-
clined to retry Fish and the charges against him were dismissed.77
Larry Gurley. A struggle involving Larry Gurley and Felix Mi-
randa outside of a Brooklyn apartment in 1971 culminated with Gur-
69. Id. at 262 n.4 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-205(A) (2001)).
70. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-205(A), 13-411 (2006). See Larson, supra note 67
(“Arizona law was changed recently, in part because of this case. Now, instead of
a defendant having to prove he acted in self-defense, the burden is on the
prosecutors.”).
71. Fish, 213 P.3d at 262 n.4 (citing Garcia v. Browning, 151 P.3d 533, 537 (Ariz.
2007)). In 2009, a statute was enacted making the legislative change regarding
the burden of proof retroactive. See State v. Montes, 245 P.3d 879 (Ariz. 2011)
(citing S.B. 1449, 2009 S., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009)).
72. Fish, 213 P.3d at 278–79.
73. Id. at 263.
74. Id. at 271–75.
75. Id. at 276–79.
76. Christian Palmer, Harold Fish Wins Another Legal Battle over 2004 Killing, ARIZ.
CAPITOL TIMES (Dec. 3, 2009), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2009/12/03/harold-
fish-wins-another-legal-battle-over-2004-killing/ [https://perma.unl.edu/N3LA-
GMDF].
77. Harold Fish, supra note 64.
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ley shooting and wounding Miranda and shooting and killing Jose
Moreno, who was standing nearby. Gurley was charged with the at-
tempted murder of Miranda and with murdering Moreno. A week
prior to the double shooting, Miranda, who was described by his wife
as a “stick up artist” who frequently carried guns,78 shattered Gur-
ley’s right arm with a gunshot, causing the right-handed Gurley to be
fitted with a cast extending to his knuckles.79 Regarding the incident
that led to the charges against him, Gurley maintained that when
they reached the stoop of the apartment they just exited, Miranda pis-
tol-whipped him in the head. Gurley grabbed the pistol barrel with his
left hand and swung his right arm, encased in the cast, at Miranda.
The gun discharged and a single bullet fatally wounded Moreno, who
was standing below at street level. The gun fell to the ground as Mi-
randa and Gurley spilled downward to the street and continued fight-
ing. Gurley grabbed the gun and shot Miranda while defending
himself.80
The prosecution’s theory was quite different, asserting essentially
that Gurley had been armed and, without provocation and while using
his left hand, fired multiple shots from the sidewalk at Miranda and
Moreno, who stood above him on the elevated apartment stoop.
Moreno’s autopsy report indicated that the fatal bullet (“estimated to
be a .25 caliber”81) had taken a downward path through his body, thus
casting doubt on the scenario envisioned by the prosecutor and tend-
ing to support Gurley’s claim that he was on the stoop and Moreno
was below him on the street when the gun discharged. However, Gur-
ley’s ballistics expert conceded on cross-examination that a .25 caliber
bullet could have deflected downward after striking Moreno’s ster-
num, thus coinciding with the prosecution’s version of events.82 The
prosecution’s case was bolstered by the testimony of Miranda’s wife,
who had separated from Miranda, and her friend who lived in the
apartment below. Miranda did not testify at Gurley’s trial; he had
been shot in an unrelated incident and died a week before the trial.83
Rejecting Gurley’s claim that Moreno’s shooting was accidental
and that he shot Miranda in self-defense, the jury at Gurley’s 1972
trial found him guilty of murder and attempted murder. Gurley was
78. People v. Gurley, 386 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff’d, 369 N.E.2d
1183 (N.Y. 1977), motion for reargument denied and motion to amend remittitur
granted, 373 N.E.2d 287 (N.Y. 1977).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 642.
82. People v. Gurley, 602 N.Y.S.2d 184, 184–85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
83. Gurley, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
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sentenced to twenty years to life imprisonment.84 In a 3–2 decision,
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed,85
with one of the dissenting judges strenuously arguing that the evi-
dence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and, moreover, that the judge’s jury instructions on self-defense were
erroneous.86 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a one-para-
graph memorandum opinion.87
In 1991, Gurley filed a motion for a new trial based on newly dis-
covered evidence. He secured access to a previously undisclosed sup-
plemental police report which concluded that the bullets used in the
1971 shootings were .22 caliber, and not .25 caliber as had been specu-
lated at Gurley’s trial. This discrepancy was significant. In contrast to
the larger .25 caliber bullet, evidence elicited at the trial indicated
that “a .22 caliber bullet . . . would have fragmented had it struck a
bone in the victim’s body.”88 The new evidence thus undermined the
prosecution’s suggestion that the downward path taken by the bullet
that killed Moreno was consistent with Gurley firing upward at him
from street level because the bullet’s trajectory could have been al-
tered by the bullet striking Moreno’s sternum. The post-conviction
hearing court vacated Gurley’s convictions, reasoning that a more
favorable verdict was probable had the newly-discovered evidence
been available and considered at his trial. The Appellate Division af-
firmed.89 In 1994, the Kings County District Attorney’s Office dis-
missed the charges against Gurley.90
Matthew Holbrook. Chris Wirth told his friend Matthew Holbrook
that a group of five or six people attacked him after someone threw a
rock at the truck he was driving. He announced that he was going to
get a gun and confront the individual who threw the rock. After hear-
ing from Wirth that none of his attackers had weapons, Holbrook re-
moved the clip from Wirth’s gun and returned the unloaded gun to
him. Holbrook then drove Wirth and another friend to the Detroit
neighborhood where Wirth had been attacked. Wirth spotted Kryice
Higgins, one of his attackers, sitting on the porch in front of a house.
Holbrook remained in his car while Wirth exited the vehicle and ad-
vanced toward Higgins. At that, Holbrook noticed movement on the
porch, heard a “pop,” and saw a muzzle flash. Apparently believing
84. Larry Gurley, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/speci
al/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4312 [https://perma.unl.edu/UZ7G-
2RFS] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Larry Gurley].
85. Gurley, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
86. Id. at 640–43 (Margett, J., dissenting).
87. People v. Gurley, 369 N.E.2d 1183 (N.Y. 1977), motion for reargument denied and
motion to amend remittitur granted, 373 N.E.2d 287 (N.Y. 1977).
88. People v. Gurley, 602 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
89. Id.
90. Larry Gurley, supra note 84.
600 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:578
that someone was shooting in their direction, Holbrook, who had a
permit to carry a concealed weapon, fired his gun toward the muzzle
flash. He told Wirth, who had been shot in the ankle, to get into his
car and they drove away. Holbrook later learned that his shot struck
and killed Lavaile Manciel, who had been on the porch. He was ar-
rested in December 2005, several months after the July 1 shooting,
and was charged with second-degree murder and unlawful possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony.91
Holbrook claimed at his June 2006 trial that he fired his gun in
self-defense. Higgins, however, testified for the prosecution that
Manciel, the shooting victim, was unarmed and had never fired a gun.
A medical examiner testified that the bullet that struck Manciel
would have paralyzed him and since his body lay in the driveway it
was unlikely that he would have been shot while on the porch of the
house. Holbrook was convicted and sentenced to seventeen to twenty-
seven years in prison.92
The Michigan Court of Appeals granted Holbrook a new trial in
2008. The court ruled that Holbrook’s trial attorney provided ineffec-
tive assistance because he failed to have Manciel’s clothing tested for
gunshot residue. Holbrook’s “self-defense theory depended, inter alia,
upon the jury believing that Manciel fired the first shot, and because
defense counsel had the means to support the theory by conducting a
simple test, the failure to conduct the test was not reasonable.”93
Moreover, “the evidence would have contradicted the testimony of the
prosecution’s only eyewitness, Kyrice Higgins, an admitted drug
dealer and convicted criminal, who stated . . . that Manciel did not
possess or fire a weapon on the night in question.”94 When the test
was conducted, it revealed that gunshot residue was indeed on
Manciel’s clothing.95 Holbrook’s new attorney additionally noticed
from photographs that the steps at the site of the shooting were wet
and he elicited testimony that blood was on them. When questioned at
Holbrook’s retrial, the medical examiner conceded that this informa-
tion was consistent with Manciel being shot while still on the porch,
and then tumbling down the steps and falling into the driveway.96
Holbrook’s initial retrial ended in a hung jury but when he was again
tried, in October 2009, a jury found him not guilty.97
91. People v. Holbrook, No. 271562, 2008 WL 2917641 (Mich. Ct. App. July 29, 2008);
Matthew Holbrook, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5161 [https://perma.unl.edu/
8VBG-4Z82] (last visited Apr. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Matthew Holbrook].
92. Matthew Holbrook, supra note 91.
93. Holbrook, 2008 WL 2917641, at *2.
94. Id. at *3.
95. Matthew Holbrook, supra note 91.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Dennis Lewchuk. Prior to Dennis Lewchuk arriving at the Brass
Rail bar in Norfolk, Nebraska, James Warner distinguished himself
by shoving, gouging the eyes of, beating, and picking fights with vari-
ous patrons. After Lewchuk entered the bar around midnight on De-
cember 21, 1979, Warner began disparaging the Joker’s Wild
motorcycle gang, which Lewchuk was affiliated with. The two men left
together in Lewchuk’s car. They would later agree that the toughness
of Joker’s Wild members was a topic of discussion, but not what led to
their violent altercation which culminated with Lewchuk stabbing
Warner twenty-five times and inflicting wounds which necessitated
roughly 500 stitches. Lewchuk claimed that Warner karate chopped
him in the throat, pulled him to the car floor, and choked him until he
nearly blacked out, at which point Lewchuk drew his knife and
stabbed Warner in self-defense. Warner contended that Lewchuk re-
peatedly stabbed him without warning and that he managed to escape
and get help after the car ran off the road. Lewchuk was later arrested
and charged with first-degree assault.98
Lewchuk’s first trial, wherein the judge allowed several witnesses
to testify about the specific acts of violence they observed Warner en-
gage in prior to Lewchuk’s arrival at the Brass Rail bar, ended in a
hung jury. At Lewchuk’s retrial in September 1980, which took place
in a different county, the judge prohibited testimony about Warner’s
violent conduct that occurred prior to Lewchuk’s arrival, concluding
that since there was no evidence Lewchuk was aware of that conduct,
it had no bearing on whether he reasonably feared Warner and hence
it was irrelevant to his claim that he acted in self-defense. The jury
found Lewchuk guilty. Lewchuk failed to appear at his sentencing
hearing and several years passed before he was located in Alabama
and returned to Nebraska. Two dozen residents of the Alabama town
where Lewchuk had relocated drove to Nebraska to offer testimony
about Lewchuk’s exemplary character and good behavior at the 1994
sentencing hearing. The judge sentenced Lewchuk to serve five to ten
years in prison on the assault conviction, and to a concurrent one-year
term for escaping.99
On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, ruling the ex-
clusion of evidence about Warner’s specific acts of violence was preju-
dicial error. The evidence was admissible to support Lewchuk’s
contention that Warner was the initial aggressor in the fight that re-
sulted in Warner’s being stabbed and thus was relevant to Lewchuk’s
self-defense claim even if Lewchuk had no knowledge of Warner’s vio-
98. State v. Lewchuk, 4 Neb. App. 165, 167, 539 N.W.2d 847, 849–51 (1995).
99. Dennis Lewchuk, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4566 [https://perma.unl.edu/
QYB9-D2SG] (last visited Apr. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Dennis Lewchuk]; Lewchuk,
539 N.W.2d at 850–51.
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lent conduct.100 Following the reversal, the prosecution dismissed the
assault charge against Lewchuk. Because he served the one-year sen-
tence imposed for escape, Lewchuk was released from prison.101
Michael Linder. In 1979, a South Carolina jury convicted Michael
Linder of murder and sentenced him to death for slaying a Highway
Patrolman, Willie Peeples. Linder had been speeding on his motorcy-
cle and then led the officer on an extended chase after refusing to pull
over in response to the squad car’s flashing lights. Peeples finally
caught up with Linder on a stretch of road. Then, according to the
prosecution, Linder used a concealed revolver to shoot Peeples as the
officer attempted to place him under arrest. Linder seized the fallen
officer’s gun and ran away, the government contended, and thereafter
inserted the spent rounds from his own gun into the officer’s weapon
to make it appear as if the officer fired at him six times. Linder’s trial
testimony was markedly different. He claimed that Peeples bumped
his motorcycle with his squad car, knocking him to the ground, and
that the officer then began firing his gun at him. Linder responded by
shooting the officer and defending himself from the potentially lethal
attack. He then panicked and ran. Not crediting Linder’s version, the
jury returned its guilty verdict and death sentence.102
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Linder a new trial on
appeal, ruling that the trial judge erroneously declined to instruct the
jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.103 At
Linder’s 1981 retrial, the defense submitted the results of a ballistics
test carried out by the South Carolina State Law Enforcement Divi-
sion, which had not been introduced at the first trial. The analysis
concluded that the bullets from the six spent rounds in Officer Peep-
les’s gun had in fact been fired from the officer’s weapon. This conclu-
sion contradicted the prosecution’s theory that Linder fired the bullets
from his own gun and then placed the cartridges in Peeples’s gun. As
in the original trial, Linder testified that the officer shot at him and
100. Lewchuk, 539 N.W.2d at 854–56.
101. Dennis Lewchuk, supra note 99.
102. State v. Linder, 278 S.E.2d 335, 336–37 (S.C. 1981) (noting Linder was also found
guilty of grand larceny); Michael Linder, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetailpre1989.aspx?caseid=
197 [https://perma.unl.edu/QF46-EUDL] (last visited May 9, 2019) [hereinafter
Michael Linder]; Associated Press, Convicted Slayer in Carolina Wins Acquittal
After Retrial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/15/
us/convicted-slayer-in-carolina-wins-acquittal-after-retrial.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/SGM7-M4VG]; Associated Press, Innocent After New Trial, CANBERRA
TIMES (Nov. 12, 1981), https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/126857719
[https://perma.unl.edu/X54F-PT2Q].
103. Linder, 278 S.E.2d at 337. The court additionally ruled that the trial judge erred
by not polling the jurors following their sentencing verdict. Id. at 337–38.
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that he returned fire in self-defense. The jury found him not guilty.104
He was released from custody after spending two years in prison, with
a part of that time on South Carolina’s death row.105
David McMahan. A long-simmering feud between two Maine lob-
stermen eventuated in their coming to blows and, ultimately, a rela-
tively rare exoneration in a case involving a misdemeanor
conviction.106 David McMahan and Gerald Brown both harvested lob-
sters in the same waters off the Maine coast. They had a history of
disagreements over several years concerning their respective fishing
rights and practices. In March 1999, the two men exchanged “a num-
ber of salty, down-east expressions”107 precipitated by Brown who sus-
pected that McMahan adorned Brown’s polyball108 with an obscene
drawing. Their verbal confrontation escalated to a physical one on Mc-
Mahan’s dock. Brown claimed that McMahan hit him from behind,
breaking a wooden gaff handle over his head. McMahan contended
that Brown screamed at him and shoved and threatened to punch
him; they both then fell from the dock and landed on rocks where they
wrestled over the gaff handle before separating; and that Brown men-
aced him with a pitchfork before stalking away. Following their fight,
Brown drove himself to a hospital. He also reported the incident to the
104. Michael Linder, supra note 102; Convicted Slayer, supra note 102; Innocent After
New Trial, supra note 102.
105. Farewell Death Row, GREENVILLE NEWS (Nov. 11, 1981), https://www.newspapers
.com/clip/12250675/the_greenville_news/ [https://perma.unl.edu/8U5W-QVR9];
Convicted Slayer, supra note 102.
106. As of July 2, 2019, just 92 of the 2,471 exonerations (3.7%) identified on the Na-
tional Registry of Exonerations involved individuals convicted of misdemeanors.
The Cases, Detailed View: Misdemeanor, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, bit.ly/
32hb8OV [https://perma.unl.edu/Z25Y-8AAN] (last visited July 2, 2019). The
small proportion of exonerations from misdemeanor convictions almost certainly
reflects a vast undercounting, attributable to many factors including the ten-
dency of organizations devoted to innocence work to focus their efforts on cases
involving greater punishment, and the investment of time and resources nor-
mally required to upset a conviction and exonerate a wrongfully convicted person.
See James R. Acker, Taking Stock of Innocence: Movements, Mountains, and
Wrongful Convictions, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 8, 16–17 (2017). This is not to
say that misdemeanor convictions do not entail significant adverse consequences,
which they often do, or that they otherwise are unimportant. See, e.g., Jenny Rob-
erts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. L. REV. 779 (2018);
Samuel R. Gross, Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 98 B.U. L. REV. 999
(2018); Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 953 (2018); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective
Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011).
107. State v. McMahan, 761 A.2d 50, 51 (Me. 2000).
108. “A polyball is a large, round, vinyl ball with a variety of uses in the commercial
trade. In this case, the ball was used to mark the location of lines to a boat moor-
ing and kept those lines suspended in the water.” Id. at 51 n.1.
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county sheriff. McMahan later was charged with aggravated assault,
a felony.109
McMahan pled not guilty, asserting he struck Brown in self-de-
fense, and opted for a bench trial. In an attempt to demonstrate that
McMahan had reason to fear Brown and acted reasonably to defend
himself when confronted on his dock, McMahan’s attorney sought to
question Brown about disputes and threats dating back several years
that involved Brown, McMahan, and other fishermen. The trial judge
sua sponte ruled the matter irrelevant and later sustained an objec-
tion to related questions. The judge thereafter declined to consider the
attorney’s legal memorandum addressing the issue and directed that
the offer of proof necessary to place the responses to the line of ques-
tioning in the record take place during the lunch recess. The offer of
proof was accordingly made in the judge’s absence. Following the re-
cess, the prosecution rested and the judge granted defense counsel’s
motion to dismiss the aggravated assault count for lack of evidence.
The trial thus proceeded only for the lesser offense of misdemeanor
assault. At the conclusion of the defense’s case, which included McMa-
han’s testimony, the judge found McMahan guilty of the misdemeanor
charge and imposed a ten day suspended jail sentence.110
The Maine Supreme Court reversed McMahan’s conviction on ap-
peal. It ruled that the trial judge’s absenting himself during the offer
of proof made over the lunch recess precluded a fully informed deci-
sion regarding the relevance of the contested evidence, and thus ne-
gated the deference normally owed a trial court ruling on an issue of
this nature. McMahan was prejudiced because a portion of the ten-
dered evidence directly pertained to “the reasonableness of McMa-
han’s belief that Brown would assault him, and his knowledge of
Brown’s asserted reputation for violence,”111 and hence was important
to his claim of self-defense. The prosecution dismissed the assault
charge against McMahan following the remand.112
Sandra Ortiz. In July 1997 in Paterson, New Jersey, Sandra Ortiz
dialed 911 to ask for assistance because she stabbed her boyfriend,
Camel “Diego” Hammad. When the police arrived at her residence
they found Hammad’s body in the bathtub. He died from a single stab
wound to his heart. Ortiz claimed that she and Hammad quarreled
while she was preparing food, and that he grabbed her and then
lunged at her while she was holding the knife she picked up to defend
herself. She did not realize until after she heard him fall in the shower
109. Id.; David McMahan, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich
.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4436 [https://perma.unl
.edu/MRA9-7P22] (last visited May 1, 2019) [hereinafter David McMahan].
110. McMahan, 761 A.2d at 52–53; David McMahan, supra note 109.
111. McMahan, 761 A.2d at 55.
112. David McMahan, supra note 109.
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that he had been stabbed. She was charged with murder. At her 2001
trial the prosecution presented evidence that undermined Ortiz’s ac-
count, including that Hammad’s blood-stained clothing was found
outside of the bathroom and that Ortiz may have tried to clean the
room before police arrived. She was found guilty as charged and a ju-
ror later explained that the jury did not believe that she acted in self-
defense.113
Prior to Ortiz being sentenced, a judge set aside her conviction
based on the prosecutor making numerous improper statements dur-
ing closing argument, including a reference to Ortiz not testifying at
the trial. At her 2003 retrial, Ortiz was represented by a new attorney.
The attorney enlisted the services of a forensic psychologist, who eval-
uated Ortiz and testified that Hammad’s recurring abuse resulted in
Ortiz exhibiting symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome and the
battered woman’s syndrome. After considering additional testimony
concerning Hammad’s abusive behavior and problems with alcohol,
the jury found Ortiz not guilty.114
Charles Podaras. Two burly six-footers, 250-pound Charles
Podaras and 300-pound Dennis Hatfield, became involved in a heated
exchange in a Menlo Park, California dog park in 2004 after Hatfield
believed that Podaras’s dog, Emerson, was acting aggressively and
hoisted the dog up by the collar. The men and various witnesses dis-
agreed about what happened next. According to some accounts,
Podaras choked, grabbed, shook, and pushed Hatfield while yelling ob-
scenities. According to others, despite Podaras’s demand, Hatfield re-
fused to relinquish his grip on Emerson, resulting in permanent
injuries to the dog’s neck, and instead responded by threatening “to
smack” Podaras. Both Podaras and Hatfield called 911. After gather-
ing information from several bystanders, the responding police officer
arrested Podaras, who was charged with misdemeanor assault.115
At the conclusion of his 2005 jury trial, Podaras was convicted of
two counts of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to ten days in jail.
Podaras filed a motion for a new trial, citing evidence that the arrest-
ing officer misrepresented in his report what witnesses at the scene of
the confrontation described, alleging prosecutorial misconduct in al-
lowing and not correcting false trial testimony, the trial judge’s failure
113. Sandra Ortiz, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/speci
al/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4199 [https://perma.unl.edu/QA55-
CYNW] (last visited May 3, 2019) [hereinafter Sandra Ortiz].
114. Id.
115. Charles Podaras, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5127 [https://perma.unl.edu/
UV23-CV4V] (last visited May 3, 2019) [hereinafter Charles Podaras]. See also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Podaras v. City of Menlo Park, 2011 WL 3809374,
at *4–5 (U.S. 2011) (No. 11-261) (alleging that the responding officer’s police re-
port was inaccurate).
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to give the jury an instruction on self-defense, and the judge’s refusal
to admit evidence concerning the 911 calls that had been made. The
motion was denied, but that decision was reversed on appeal because
of the judge’s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense. Podaras was
granted a new trial. On remand, the prosecution dismissed the
charges.116
Harvill Richardson. Rudy Quilon had recently been released from
prison and was homeless in Biloxi, Mississippi in 2009 when sixty-six-
year-old Harvill Richardson learned about his circumstances through
his church and invited Quilon to move into his home on a temporary
basis. Five months later, Richardson had enough of Quilon and or-
dered him to leave. Quilon, who had prior convictions for murder and
armed robbery, boasted about having killed a snitch while in prison
and about his gang membership, and began watching pornography on
Richardson’s computer. The final straw came when Quilon stated that
he wanted to have sex with Richardson’s wife. Instead of leaving,
Quilon walked to a shed in Richardson’s backyard which contained
axes and other tools, and reentered the house with one arm behind his
back. Then, according to Richardson, Quilon approached him in a
threatening manner and Richardson, who armed himself with a pistol,
fired a warning shot into the ground. When Quilon kept advancing,
Richardson shot him in the stomach at close range. Richardson then
called 911. Quilon died from the gunshot wound and Richardson was
charged with murder.117
At Richardson’s 2011 trial, the judge excluded evidence of Quilon’s
prior convictions and his prior acts of violence,118 including Richard-
son’s knowledge of them, ruling that this evidence would represent
impermissible impeachment evidence and would be unfairly prejudi-
cial.119 The jury rejected Richardson’s claim that he shot Quilon in
self-defense and convicted him of murder. Richardson was sentenced
to life imprisonment. In 2014, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed
in a 6–3 decision. The court held the excluded evidence had not been
offered for impeachment purposes but instead bore directly on Rich-
ardson’s self-defense claim, in particular whether he actually and rea-
116. Charles Podaras, supra note 115; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Podaras, supra
note 115, at *4–9.
117. Richardson v. State, 147 So. 3d 838, 839–40 (Miss. 2014); Harvill Richardson,
Sr., NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera
tion/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5113 [https://perma.unl.edu/TH2Y-ZHBE]
(last visited May 6, 2019) [hereinafter Harvill Richardson].
118. Addressing Richardson’s defense counsel, the judge said:
What I’m not going to allow you to bring forth to this jury is the fact that
this victim [was] alleged to be a gang member in San Diego . . . . That he
had killed a cell mate by throwing him to the ground and strangling him.
And that he had executed a young lady because she was a snitch.
Richardson, 147 So. 3d at 845.
119. Id. at 840–41.
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sonably believed that Quilon was threatening him with lethal violence
when he shot him.120 The excluded evidence was admitted at Richard-
son’s 2017 retrial, where Richardson again insisted that he shot
Quilon in self-defense. After deliberating for three hours, the jury ac-
quitted Richardson, who had served forty-one months in prison pursu-
ant to his 2011 conviction.121
Christopher Roesser. Shortly before Christmas 2006, Christopher
Roesser entered the rear seat of a parked car in Lawrenceville, Geor-
gia with $2,000 in cash. In the driver’s seat was Allen Epstein and in
the front passenger seat, Keith Price. Within minutes, Roesser shot
and killed Price. Police found a plastic pellet gun, $2,000, and
Roesser’s glasses in the vicinity of the shooting. Dramatically different
testimony was offered in explanation of these events at Roesser’s 2008
trial for murder and related charges. Epstein testified that Roesser
and Price argued over the cost of marijuana that Roesser planned to
sell, resulting in Roesser shooting Price. Epstein denied that he told
the police that Price trained a gun on Roesser and a detective con-
firmed that testimony. In contrast, Roesser claimed that he brought
the cash to purchase a Sony PlayStation as a Christmas gift and that
when he entered the car Price grabbed him by the collar, pointed a
gun at him, and demanded the money. Fearing for his life, Roesser
testified, he fled the vehicle, firing his gun at Price as he did so. The
jury convicted Roesser and he was sentenced to life in prison plus five
years.122
Roesser’s motion for a new trial was granted in 2009 because the
trial judge gave erroneous jury instructions.123 At his 2011 retrial,
Roesser introduced previously undisclosed notes of the medical exam-
120. Id. at 841–44. See also Eugene Volokh, Putting the Victim on Trial, WASH. POST
(July 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2014/07/01/putting-the-victim-on-trial/?utm_term=.51b6f5990397 [https://perma
.unl.edu/3VCG-MDY3] (noting the importance of Quilon’s past offenses regarding
Richardson’s self-defense claim).
121. Harvill Richardson, supra note 117; WLOX Staff, Harvill Richardson Found Not
Guilty of Murder, WLOX.COM (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.wlox.com/story/
34868363/jurors-hear-testimony-in-harvill-richardson-retrial/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/77PT-GSTY].
122. Christopher Roesser, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4308 [https://perma.unl.edu/
7MG9-78GE] (last visited May 7, 2019) [hereinafter Christopher Roesser]. See
also Roesser v. State, 730 S.E.2d 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 751 S.E.2d 297
(Ga. 2013) (describing similar testimony offered at Roesser’s 2011 retrial).
123. Roesser v. State, 751 S.E.2d 297, 298 (Ga. 2013); Christopher Roesser, supra note
122. The specific nature of the erroneous jury instruction is unclear. See also
Keith Farmer, Supreme Court Orders Lawrenceville Man Free of Manslaughter
Charges, GWINNETT DAILY POST (Nov. 17, 2013), https://www.gwinnettdailypost
.com/archive/supreme-court-orders-lawrenceville-man-free-of-manslaughter-char
ges/article_04c10e3f-ac14-530d-b8ae-03901a555e7f.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
8EL5-BRSM] (noting a retrial was granted after an erroneous jury instruction).
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iner’s investigator, which indicated that the detective assigned to the
case reported that Epstein told him that Price pointed a gun at
Roesser and threatened to kill him. The investigator testified and con-
firmed what was recorded in the notes. In addition, a defense investi-
gator testified that he interviewed Epstein’s uncle, who told him that
Epstein confided in him that Price pointed a gun at Roesser while de-
manding his money. A ballistics expert testified and opined that Ep-
stein’s wounds likely were inflicted as Roesser was leaving the parked
car.124 The jury found Roesser not guilty of the homicide-related
charges except for voluntary manslaughter, which resulted in a dead-
locked verdict of 11–1 in favor of acquittal.125 The prosecution an-
nounced its intention to retry Roesser on the voluntary manslaughter
charge, but the Georgia Supreme Court prohibited the retrial on
double jeopardy grounds. The court reasoned that the acquittal on the
murder charge meant the jury accepted that Roesser shot Price in self-
defense, thus also barring his prosecution for voluntary manslaugh-
ter.126 Roesser, who had been incarcerated since his original convic-
tion in 2008, was released from custody in November 2013.127
Gerald Sailors. While off duty from his service as a captain on the
Huntington, Indiana Police Department, Gerald Sailors shot and
killed Michael Fisher, whom he knew and socialized with for roughly
three years. The shooting occurred in Sailors’s car shortly after mid-
night on June 21, 1990. According to Sailors, Fisher volunteered to
show him “crack houses” in the area but when he had trouble locating
them, Sailors announced that he was ending their excursion. Fisher
discussed his own problems with drugs as they began driving to where
Fisher left his car and then showed Sailors a substantial quantity of
marijuana seeds. When Sailors informed Fisher that he was going to
have him jailed for possession of marijuana, Sailors claimed that
Fisher struck him repeatedly, choked him, and threatened to kill him
and his family. As he began to lose consciousness, and fearing that
Fisher would carry through with his threats, Sailors drew his revolver
and shot Fisher, striking him in the head and chest. Sailors then
drove to the police station in nearby Roanoke. Fisher was pronounced
dead and Sailors later was indicted for voluntary manslaughter.128
124. Christopher Roesser, supra note 122.
125. Roesser, 730 S.E.2d at 643 n.9. The jurors also were unable to reach a verdict on
two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, but the
trial court ruled that Roesser could not be retried on those charges because of his
acquittal of the predicate felonies. Id. at 643 n.10.
126. Roesser, 751 S.E.2d at 297.
127. Bill Rankin, Man in ‘06 Gwinnett Shooting to Be Freed, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov.
18, 2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/crime—law/man-gwinnett-shooting-freed/
V8VyPmx3BfI1qTVRiB90uJ/ [https://perma.unl.edu/X9A8-HFTA].
128. Gerald Sailors, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/spe-
cial/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5175 [https://perma.unl.edu/
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The trial judge denied Sailors’s motion for a change of venue based
on prejudicial pretrial publicity, but granted his motion to exclude evi-
dence the prosecution sought to introduce that Sailors and Fisher
were involved in a homosexual relationship and that the shooting was
motivated to conceal that relationship.129 Trial testimony included the
Huntington Police Chief noting that he had no knowledge of Sailors’s
purported investigation of “crack houses,” reports by medical person-
nel that Sailors had no apparent choke marks about his neck when he
was treated for cuts and bruises about the face following the shooting,
and that of a crime lab analyst who opined that blood splatter pat-
terns in Sailors’s car were inconsistent with Fisher being shot while
the vehicle’s door was closed, as Sailors contended. Sailors presented
evidence suggesting that he indeed had been choked, that he at-
tempted to neutralize the testimony of the crime lab analyst, and he
testified that he shot Fisher in self-defense after Fisher “went ber-
serk” and attacked him.130 During his closing argument, the special
prosecutor pressed for a conviction while reminding the trial jury that
Sailors had been indicted by the grand jury—“six of your fellow citi-
zens”131—which already had “investigated”132 the case. The jury
found Sailors guilty of voluntary manslaughter and he was sentenced
to a twenty-two-year term of imprisonment.133
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed Sailors’s conviction in 1992.
The court determined that the prosecutor’s references to the grand
jury indictment during his closing argument constituted “fundamental
error” which, in light of “the close nature of the evidence against”
Sailors, undermined the fairness of the trial. Those references, the
court concluded, “were clearly exhortations to the jury to convict
Sailors because other people thought he was guilty.”134 Sailors was
retried in 1993 following a change of venue to Indianapolis. Supported
by the testimony of two defense experts regarding the blood splatter
patterns in the car and other evidence related to the shooting and
Sailors’s own testimony that he shot Fisher in self-defense, the jury
found Sailors not guilty.135
Lydia Salce. When Michael McKee returned to his home in Half-
moon, New York in the early morning of August 11, 2011, he and his
H8HM-V5Z5] (last visited May 7, 2019) [hereinafter Gerald Sailors]; Sailors v.
State, 593 N.E.2d 202, 203–04 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
129. Gerald Sailors, supra note 128.
130. Id.; Sailors, 593 N.E.2d at 204–05.
131. Sailors, 593 N.E.2d at 206.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 204.
134. Id. at 207.
135. Gerald Sailors, supra note 128; Jury Acquits Ex-Policeman of Manslaughter, IN-
DIANAPOLIS STAR (July 28, 1993), https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/
107341832/ (access through subscription).
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wife, Lydia Salce, engaged in a violent confrontation that left McKee
with fourteen cut and stab wounds and Salce bruised from McKee’s
fist blows to her face. The couple offered “[m]arkedly different ver-
sions”136 of what transpired. McKee, who recovered from Salce’s at-
tack following hospitalization, claimed that Salce was infuriated about
him spending so much time with members of the “Prisoners of Faith”
motorcycle club and that at the conclusion of their verbal argument he
turned to leave, at which time Salce stabbed him in the back. As she
continued to stab him, he struck her to defend himself. Salce con-
tended that McKee came home intoxicated, threw a glass at her,
grabbed her by the hair, held a knife to her throat, and then began
hitting her. She maintained that he dropped the knife and she picked
it up and began swinging it to defend herself from his attack. She
called 911 after stabbing McKee. Salce subsequently was charged with
attempted murder and assault.137
At her 2012 trial, Salce continued to insist that she stabbed McKee
in self-defense. Her attorney sought to elicit testimony from an expert
witness, “a police officer with expertise in assaults and knives . . . that
the nature of [Salce’s] injuries and McKee’s wounds were not inconsis-
tent with defensive action by [Salce].”138 The prosecution previously
presented testimony from the police “indicating that they relied on the
extensive nature of McKee’s wounds in believing his version and de-
cided to charge [Salce].”139 The jury convicted Salce of attempted mur-
der and assault and she was sentenced to sixteen years in prison.
Salce’s convictions were reversed on appeal in 2015. The Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court ruled that excluding the de-
fense expert’s opinion that McKee’s injuries were consistent with de-
fensive wounds was prejudicial error, particularly because the
prosecution presented testimony about the “extensive nature” of those
wounds.140 Salce was retried later that year. The jury heard the previ-
ously excluded expert testimony and also heard Salce testify that she
136. People v. Salce, 1 N.Y.S.3d 417, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
137. Id. at 419–20. See also Lydia Salce, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www
.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4691 [https://
perma.unl.edu/FS99-TMPU] (last visited May 7, 2019) (detailing Lydia Salce’s
conviction) [hereinafter Lydia Salce]; Lucian McCarty, Lydia Ann Salce Sen-
tenced for Stabbing Ex- Husband, TROY REC. (Sept. 1, 2012), https://www.troyrec
ord.com/news/lydia-ann-salce-sentenced-for-stabbing-ex-husband/article_9baf08
40-713c-58f1-96d0-66c93f705527.html [https://perma.unl.edu/SSU6-58N9].
138. Salce, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 421.
139. Id
140. Id. The court further found that the trial court erred by not including in the jury
instructions that Salce had no duty to retreat before using deadly defensive force
while in her home. Id.
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acted in self-defense. Salce was acquitted following the three-week
long retrial.141
Teresa Thomas. “On September 15, 1993, twenty-nine-year-old Te-
resa Thomas fatally shot her live-in boyfriend, Jerry ‘Jake’ Flowers, in
their trailer on Tick Ridge, an unpaved road in northeastern Athens
County, Ohio.”142 The following week a grand jury indicted her for
aggravated murder. Just three months later, on December 20, 1993, a
jury rejected Thomas’s claim that she shot Flowers in self-defense.
She was convicted of murder with a firearm specification and sen-
tenced to eighteen years to life in prison.143
A clinical psychologist testifying at Thomas’s trial opined that
Thomas manifested classic symptoms of the battered woman’s syn-
drome. Thomas testified that Flowers repeatedly beat her, sometimes
refused to allow her to eat for three to four day stretches, intentionally
soiled his clothes and made her clean them, forced her into having
sexual relations, and often reminded her how easily he could kill her.
The night before the shooting Flowers threw food and drink on the
floor of the couple’s trailer and told Thomas he would kill her if she did
not clean up the mess before he returned from work the next day.
Thomas had not finished cleaning when Flowers appeared somewhat
earlier than expected. He began yelling and threatened to kill her.
Thomas retrieved Flowers’s gun from his closet and then, she testi-
fied, “she fired two warning shots and when Flowers continued to
threaten her, she shot him in the arm twice . . . . Flowers fell and then
started to get up again, continuing to threaten Thomas. Thomas shot
Flowers two more times while he was bent over; the shots entered
Flowers in the back.”144
At the time of Thomas’s trial, Ohio law was unclear about whether
the resident of a dwelling had a duty to retreat before using deadly
defensive force in the dwelling against a co-inhabitant in order to suc-
ceed on a justification defense. The trial judge failed to instruct the
jury that a cohabitant had no duty to retreat under those circum-
stances. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed Thomas’s conviction and
141. Lydia Salce, supra note 137; Jury Acquits in Saratoga County Attempted Murder
Trial, ALB. TIMES UNION (May 15, 2015), https://www.timesunion.com/news/arti
cle/Jury-acquits-in-Saratoga-County-attempted-murder-6258958.php [https://per
ma.unl.edu/G9P7-WH4J]; Lauren Mineau, Jury Clears Wife in Biker’s Stabbing,
ONEIDA DAILY DISPATCH (May 14, 2015), https://www.oneidadispatch.com/news/
jury-clears-wife-in-biker-s-stabbing/article_5390df85-6630-5f29-bbd1-288ec9f83f
13.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2PLQ-KNTL].
142. Teresa Thomas, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/speci
al/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4124 [https://perma.unl.edu/BQ9P-
9HP7] (last visited May 9, 2019) [hereinafter Teresa Thomas].
143. State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (Ohio 1997); Teresa Thomas, supra note
142.
144. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d at 1341.
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ordered a new trial, ruling that “[t]here is no duty to retreat from one’s
own home before resorting to lethal force in self-defense against a co-
habitant with an equal right to be in the home,”145 and that Thomas
was entitled to have her jury so instructed. A jury found Thomas not
guilty at her 1997 retrial.146
James Williams. In a case that would be memorialized in a bestsel-
ling book147 and a movie directed by Clint Eastwood,148 James Wil-
liams, a fifty-year-old patrician of Savannah, Georgia, shot and killed
twenty-one-year-old Danny Hansford in Williams’s home, the spacious
Mercer House, on May 2, 1981. According to Williams, Hansford, a
volatile young man who assisted Williams in his acquisition and resto-
ration of upscale antiques, flew into a rage, threw over a large grand-
father clock, and shot at him during a late night argument, prompting
Williams to return fire in self-defense. The prosecution contended that
an angry Williams shot Hansford—his young homosexual lover—
without provocation and then, to back up his fabricated self-defense
claim, damaged property in the room, fired bullets into the floor, and
planted a gun under Hansford’s hand after he lay dead. Williams was
charged with murder. He was convicted and sentenced to life impris-
onment following his talk-of-the-town 1982 Savannah trial.149
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. It ruled that, de-
spite defense counsel’s request, the prosecution failed to disclose the
contents of a police report that conflicted with the testimony of an in-
vestigating officer concerning the officer’s opinion about whether a
bullet hole found in the floor of Williams’s home was “fresh.”150 Wil-
liams would be tried twice more in Savannah on the murder charge.
He was again found guilty and sentenced to life in prison in October
1983. The Georgia Supreme Court once again reversed the conviction
on appeal.151 In his third trial in 1987 the jury deadlocked 11–1 in
145. Id. at 1340.
146. Teresa Thomas, supra note 142.
147. JOHN BERENDT, MIDNIGHT IN THE GARDEN OF GOOD AND EVIL: A SAVANNAH STORY
(1994).
148. MIDNIGHT IN THE GARDEN OF GOOD AND EVIL (Warner Bros., Nov. 21, 1997).
149. James Williams, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/spe
cial/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4195 [https://perma.unl.edu/
DH6C-862G] (last visited May 9, 2019) [hereinafter James Williams]; Williams v.
State, 298 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 1983); BERENDT, supra note 147, at 210–31.
150. Williams, 298 S.E.2d at 464–65 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
151. Williams v. State, 330 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. 1985). In this 4–3 decision, the majority
ruled that a testifying detective had erroneously been allowed to offer an expert
opinion about matters relating to the crime scene, reasoning that the subjects of
the testimony were not “beyond the ken of average [lay jurors].” The majority
further determined that the prosecutor had improperly introduced new evidence
during his closing argument to the jury. Id. at 355.
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favor of conviction.152 The prosecution commenced a fourth trial,153
which took place in Augusta rather than publicity-saturated Savan-
nah, pursuant to Williams’s change of venue motion. The Augusta
jury found him not guilty in May 1989.154 Williams spent hundreds of
thousands of dollars in his defense155 and endured lengthy incarcera-
tion over the protracted sequence of trial and retrials.156 Eight
months following his acquittal, at age fifty-nine, he collapsed and died
in his Savannah home.157
B. Exonerations in the Wake of Rejected Excuse Defenses
Yun Hseng Liao. Somnambulism, or sleepwalking, is a complete
defense to a charged crime in several jurisdictions. Jurisdictions rec-
ognize this defense because individuals who engage in harmful con-
duct while sleeping are unconscious, and thus either lack mens rea or
their actions are involuntary. Consistent with its obligation to prove
all elements of a crime, the prosecution consequently must negate
somnambulism beyond a reasonable doubt when it is fairly at is-
sue.158 In other jurisdictions, somnambulism is considered an affirma-
tive defense, a form of excuse, thus allowing the burden of persuasion
to be assigned to the defendant.159 Yun Hseng Liao was convicted in
California160 in 2003 of attempted murder, assault with a deadly
152. Williams v. State, 369 S.E.2d 305, 309 (Ga. 1988); James Williams, supra note
149; BERENDT, supra note 147, at 357–58, 363.
153. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected Williams’s motion to bar another trial on
double jeopardy grounds, and to disqualify the Chatham County district attorney
and his staff from participating in the case. Williams, 369 S.E.2d at 232.
154. In addition to the new venue for the trial being a factor that may have helped
explain the acquittal, testimony from a new witness corroborated another wit-
ness’s testimony (which had been received at the third trial) that was offered to
explain the absence of gunpowder residue on Danny Hansford’s hands—a finding
the prosecution argued undermined Williams’s contention that Hansford fired a
gun at him and supported the prosecution’s theory that Williams manipulated
the scene of the shooting to substantiate his claim that he shot Hansford in self-
defense. James Williams, supra note 149, BERENDT, supra note 147, at 368–69.
155. BERENDT, supra note 147, at 339.
156. Id. at 329.
157. Id. at 382–83.
158. See, e.g., State v. Cabrera, 891 A.2d 1066, 1071–73 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005); Mc-
Clain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 106–07 (Ind. 1997); Deborah W. Denno, Crime
and Consciousness, Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 338, 338
n.314, 346–48, 366–74 (2002); Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Automatism
or Unconsciousness as Defense to Criminal Charge, 27 A.L.R. 4th 1067, § 4[a]
(1984 & Supp.).
159. See, e.g., Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 143–47 (Wyo. 1981); State v. Caldell, 215
S.E.2d 348, 363 (N.C. 1975); Denno, supra note 158; Eichelberger, supra note
158.
160. In California, somnambulism appears to operate as a “failure of proof” defense, a
class consisting “of instances in which, because of the conditions that are the ba-
sis for the ‘defense,’ all elements of the offense charged cannot be proven. They
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weapon, and injuring a child after he struck the sixteen-year-old son
of his live-in partner three times in the head with a hammer. Liao
maintained that he was sleepwalking when he entered the boy’s room
at 4:00 a.m. and hit him with the hammer.161
Among the defense witnesses at Liao’s trial was Dr. Clete Kushida,
director of the Stanford University Center for Human Sleep Research.
Dr. Kushida reviewed various transcripts and reports regarding Liao
but he had not personally examined Liao. He opined that Liao “may be
a sleepwalker,” but disclaimed that this was a diagnosis, which would
require “a clinical evaluation, and perhaps ‘a sleep study, but the sleep
study is optional.’”162 On cross-examination, Dr. Kushida “was ‘clob-
bered’ . . . [and] ‘his credibility was pretty much destroyed’”163 because
no formal sleep study, involving a battery of tests monitoring brain
activity during sleep, had been conducted. Liao’s trial attorney re-
quested the trial court’s authorization to have a sleep study performed
on Liao, who was in pretrial custody. The court granted the request
but a clerk erroneously informed trial counsel that the request had
been denied, so no sleep study was conducted. When the order grant-
ing the request was discovered following Liao’s conviction, the state
are in essence no more than the negation of an element required by the definition
of the offense.” Robinson, supra note 28, at 204 (footnote omitted). Consequently,
in California the prosecution is required to disprove somnambulism beyond a rea-
sonable doubt if the matter is fairly put at issue in a criminal case. People v.
Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 922 (Cal. 1974), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094 (Cal. 1998); People v. Cruz, 147 Cal. Rptr. 740, 754–55
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978) superseded by statute, CALJIC 4.31, as recognized in People
v. Levell, 247 Cal. Rptr. 489, 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Mike Horn, A Rude Awak-
ening: What to Do with the Sleepwalking Defense?, 46 B.C. L. REV. 149, 163–64
(2004). We nevertheless discuss Liao’s California conviction and exoneration be-
cause somnambulism is treated as an affirmative defense in some other jurisdic-
tions. See supra text accompanying note 159.
161. People v. Liao, Nos. B170596, B185117, 2006 WL 2022826, at *1–4. (Cal. Ct. App.
2006), vacated Liao v. Junious, 817 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 2016). Liao had a history of
sleep disorders. His former wife testified at trial that he often awakened during
the night, then sat up as if terrified, and walked about in a daze. A psychiatrist,
Dr. Vicary, opined that Liao suffered from a sleep disorder that was aggravated
by depression. Liao and his live-in partner argued on the night of the incident
and she had recently told him she was ending their five-year-long relationship.
After he struck sixteen-year-old Henry Chen with a hammer, resulting in the
charges against him, Liao appeared to be shocked. When asked why he hit the
boy, he replied that he was dreaming that someone was hitting him, so he fought
back. Liao’s conviction ultimately was vacated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. See Yun Hseng Liao, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.u
mich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5301 [https://perma
.unl.edu/M83T-DS4M] (last visited May 14, 2019) [hereinafter Yun Hseng Liao].
162. Liao, 2006 WL 2022826, at *5.
163. Liao, 817 F.3d at 690 (quoting the attorney representing California at oral
argument).
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courts164 and a federal district court165 concluded that Liao’s attorney
performed unreasonably in not uncovering the error, but that Liao
was not entitled to a new trial based on ineffective assistance of coun-
sel because he was not prejudiced by the oversight.166
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Liao’s conviction in
2016. In granting Liao a new trial, the court concluded that the lack of
a sleep study seriously compromised the fairness of the original trial.
“His attorney’s serious mistake, triggered by an equally grievous error
by a court clerk, eviscerated a viable defense of unconsciousness. His
conviction represents an extreme malfunction of justice caused by a
violation his Sixth Amendment right to competent and effective coun-
sel.”167 Liao had been sentenced to life imprisonment and four years
upon his conviction, but he had been released on parole by the time of
the court’s ruling, after spending more than twelve years in prison.168
The Court of Appeal pointedly observed that “[i]t is difficult to con-
ceive of circumstances under which the State would again take him
before a jury.”169 The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
dismissed the charges against Liao following the remand.170
164. The California Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing to
determine what caused the mix-up concerning the sleep test. Liao, 2006 WL
2022826, at *11. The hearing was conducted, but in unreported decisions, the
trial court and the California Court of Appeal rejected Liao’s request for a new
trial. Liao v. Junious, No. CV 10-5691 SJO (JCG), 2013 WL 8446035, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. 2013), recommendation accepted with modification, Liao v. Junious, No. CV
10-5691 JGB (JCBG), 2014 WL 1920970 (C.D. Cal. 2014), reversed, Liao, 817 F.3d
678.
165. Liao, 2014 WL 1920970 (C.D. Cal. 2014), reversed, Liao, 817 F.3d 678.
166. The courts applied the two-part performance and prejudice test governing claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984):
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective
as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two compo-
nents. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the de-
ficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings,
it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Id. at 687.
To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
167. Liao, 817 F.3d at 695.
168. Id. at 681.
169. Id. at 695.
170. Yun Hseng Liao, supra note 161.
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Erwin Charles Simants. In a burst of violence that rocked the
small town of Sutherland, Nebraska in October 1975, and later occa-
sioned a landmark Supreme Court case weighing the right to freedom
of the press against the right to a fair trial,171 Erwin Charles Simants
entered the home of Henry and Audrey Kellie, sexually assaulted
their ten-year-old granddaughter, and then shot and killed all six fam-
ily members, including two other children aged five and seven. Evi-
dence suggested that he also had sexual contact with Mrs. Kellie and
her five-year-old granddaughter after killing them. Simants, who
lived in the house next door, then returned home and told relatives
that he killed the Kellies. After his father confirmed his twenty-nine-
year-old son’s story, he instructed his wife to call the police. In the
meantime, Simants drank beer at two local bars and then spent the
night in a field. He was taken into custody the next morning after he
was denied entry to his sister’s home and she contacted law enforce-
ment. Simants confessed the killings to the police.172
Simants was charged with six counts of first-degree murder. He
pled not guilty by reason of insanity at his 1976 trial. The trial thus
focused on Simants’s “capacity to understand the nature of the act al-
leged to be criminal and the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong with respect to the act.”173 The jury heard from twenty-four
prosecution witnesses and eleven defense witnesses174 about the kill-
ing and about Simants, who was described as “an unemployed handy-
171. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See David B. Sentelle, The Courts
and the Media, 48 FED. LAW. 24 (2001); James C. Goodale, The Press Ungagged:
The Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1977); Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, Panel and Discussion—
Recent Developments in Fair Trial-Free Press: The Relationship of Historical
First Amendment Guarantees of a Free Press and the Requirements of a Fair
Trial, the Legal Issues Raised by the Judicial Gag Orders, and the Impact of Such
Orders on the Press, 73 F.R.D. 147, 159–99 (1976); Fred W. Friendly, A Crime and
Its Aftershock, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/03/21/
archives/a-crime-and-its-aftershock-aftershock.html? [https://perma.unl.edu/
FLL9-YGJ2].
172. State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881, 884–85 (1977), overruled by
State v. Reeves, 243 Neb. 711, 453 N.W.2d 359, 375 (1990); Friendly, supra note
171; Associated Press, Man Guilty of Oklahoma Murders; Defendant in Nebraska
Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 1979), https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/18/
archives/man-guilty-of-oklahoma-murders-defendant-in-nebraska-acquitted-six
.html [https://perma.unl.edu/DRX3-S33X] [hereinafter Man Guilty of Oklahoma
Murders]; Sharron Hollen, 30 Years Later, A Sad Anniversary, N. PLATTE TELE-
GRAPH (Oct. 18, 2005), https://www.nptelegraph.com/years-later-a-sad-anniversa
ry/article_d7548606-96aa-50c3-bdb6-6864b91f9cde.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
K5QE-J74K].
173. Simants, 197 Neb. at 570, 250 N.W.2d at 893 (quoting State v. Jacobs, 190 Neb.
4, 6, 205 N.W.2d 662, 663 (1973)).
174. Hollen, supra note 172.
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man and fence-builder with an IQ of 75.”175 “[S]ubstantial evidence”
undermined Simants’s insanity defense, including testimony from two
defense expert witnesses, one of whom opined that Simants “was
aware of what he was doing” on the night of the killings.176 The jury
found Simants guilty on all counts and the trial judge sentenced him
to death.177
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld Simants’s convictions and
death sentence on appeal in 1977.178 Simants’s attorney filed a writ of
error coram nobis the following year, challenging the conviction based
on information that was unknown at the time of the trial. The writ
alleged that the county sheriff, who appeared as a prosecution wit-
ness, visited members of the sequestered jury while the trial was in
progress and conversed and played cards with them, thus tainting the
fairness of the trial.179 As a part of his trial testimony, the sheriff re-
ported that Simants never engaged in acts in his presence “which
would indicate . . . that he might have a mental problem.”180 The dis-
trict court held a hearing on the writ and found that the sheriff had
improper contact with the jurors on three occasions while the trial was
in progress, but it concluded that Simants suffered no prejudice. The
Nebraska Supreme Court reversed. It held that the unwarranted con-
tact was presumptively prejudicial and that the State had not over-
come that presumption. The court vacated Simants’s convictions and
death sentence, explaining:
The sheriff was an important lay witness on the issue of the sanity of the
defendant, which was the only real issue in the murder trial. The jury had to
decide the question of Simants’s sanity. The expert testimony was conflicting
on that point. The jury had to weigh that testimony. In deciding the issue, the
opinion testimony of a lay witness in whom the jury may have had special
confidence because of unwarranted contacts such as are shown by the evi-
dence may have been the critical factor in determining the one key issue
which was determinative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.181
Simants was retried in October 1979. The trial venue was changed
from North Platte, the county where the killings and the original trial
occurred, to Lincoln, the state capital. Simants was represented by
175. Friendly, supra note 171.




179. Simants v. State, 202 Neb. 828, 829, 277 N.W.2d 217, 218 (1979). The writ also
alleged that the trial judge had visited the sequestered jurors. The judge made
two visits to the hotel where the jurors were sequestered to check on the accom-
modations and to ensure that his sequestration orders were being followed, but
his conversations were limited to “a cursory acknowledgment or response to a
greeting or comment.” Id.
180. Id. (quoting the question to Sheriff Gordon D. Gilster during Simants’s trial, and
stating that the sheriff’s answer was “[n]o.”).
181. Id. at 221.
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new counsel, who conceded that Simants killed the Kellies and fo-
cused exclusively on the insanity defense. After hearing the evidence
and deliberating for eighteen hours, the jury found Simants not guilty
by reason of insanity.182 Simants was civilly committed at the conclu-
sion of the trial.183 He remained under civil confinement as of the end
of 2018.184 Simants’s acquittal prompted calls for revising Nebraska’s
insanity defense. In 1981, legislation was enacted in the state requir-
ing defendants to establish their insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence. Previously, the prosecution had been required to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not insane.185
Andrea Yates. In June 2001, Andrea Yates systematically drowned
her five children—seven-year-old Noah, five-year-old John, three-
year-old Paul, two-year-old Luke, and six-month-old Mary—in the
bathtub at her home in the Houston suburb of Clear Lake, Texas. She
telephoned her husband, Rusty, who worked at the NASA Space
Center, and told him to come home. She then dialed 911 and told the
dispatcher that she needed a police officer. When an officer arrived
she told him, “I just killed my kids.” The bodies of the four youngest
children lay on the bed in the master bedroom and Noah’s floated in
the bathtub.186 Yates was charged with two counts of capital mur-
der.187 The Harris County District Attorney sought the death penalty.
Andrea Yates was the captain of her high school swim team, vale-
dictorian of her graduating class, earned a degree from the University
of Texas School of Nursing, and was employed as a registered nurse
182. Margaret Reist, 38 Years Later, Simants Murder Case Still Raises Tough Ques-
tions, LINCOLN J. STAR (Oct. 21, 2013), https://journalstar.com/news/state-and-re-
gional/nebraska/years-later-simants-murder-case-still-raises-tough-questions/
article_4ad142f1-ef56-52ea-9d3a-63de73a830ca.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
5HQS-4W54]; Man Guilty of Oklahoma Murders, supra note 172.
183. State v. Simants, 248 Neb. 581, 582, 537 N.W.2d 346, 348 (1995).
184. Tammy Bain, Simants Is “Still Mentally Ill and Dangerous,” Judge Rules, OMAHA
WORLD- HERALD (Dec. 23, 2018), https://www.omaha.com/eedition/sunrise/arti-
cles/simants-is-still-mentally-ill-and-dangerous-judge-rules/article_3f41f6fc-cfd7-
53ef-9cbf-7736e6bc3000.html [https://perma.unl.edu/TR2C-FJAQ]. Simants was
“in a residential transition unit at [the Lincoln Regional Center]. He never leaves
unless accompanied by a relative or staff members.” Id.
185. Reist, supra note 182; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2203 (Reissue 2016); see gener-
ally State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989); State v. Hankins, 232
Neb. 608, 637, 441 N.W.2d 854, 875–76 (1989); State v. Newson, 183 Neb. 750,
164 N.W.2d 211 (1969).
186. SUZANNE O’MALLEY, “ARE YOU THERE ALONE?” THE UNSPEAKABLE CRIME OF AN-
DREA YATES 1–5 (2004); see also Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215, 216–18 (Tex. App.
2005) (discussing the facts of the murders of Andrea Yates’s children, and Andrea
Yates’s mental state at the time of and immediately following the murders).
187. One of the charges related to the deaths of Noah and John Yates and qualified as
capital murder under the section of Texas law making the killing of multiple vic-
tims a capital offense. The other charge related to the death of Mary; another
provision of Texas law made the murder of a child younger than six a capital
offense. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 216 n.1.
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prior to her 1993 marriage.188 She also had an extensive history of
mental illness, dating back to shortly after Noah’s birth in 1994. In
the ensuing years, while giving birth to four more children, she exper-
ienced hallucinations, twice attempted suicide, was variously diag-
nosed with postnatal psychosis, major depression, schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder, was intermittently administered antipsychotic medi-
cation, and was hospitalized multiple times because of her mental
health difficulties. After Luke, her fourth child, was born in 1999, she
was strongly warned by an attending psychiatrist that additional
pregnancies would likely further jeopardize her mental health.189 In
March 2001, Yates’s father died, causing her condition to worsen. Two
months later, in May, she filled the bathtub in her home with water
for no apparent reason. When her mother-in-law asked her about
drawing the water, she replied that she “might need it.”190 She
drowned her children on June 20, two days after she last visited with
a psychiatrist.191
Yates’s trial began in February 2002. She entered pleas of not
guilty by reason of insanity to the capital murder charges. Under
Texas law, to be acquitted by reason of insanity, she would have to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that, at the time of the con-
duct charged, [she], as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did
not know that [her] conduct was wrong.”192 Yates claimed to believe
that she had been marked by Satan and that the only way to save her
children from hell was to kill them, causing them to go to heaven and
be with God, and her to be punished, thus destroying Satan in the
process.193 Ten psychiatrists and two psychologists testified at her
trial. Four of the psychiatrists and one psychologist examined Yates
prior to the killings and described the severity of her symptoms and
their attempts to treat her. The other mental health professionals saw
her after the killings, either to treat her or to assess her mental state,
and were asked their opinions about whether she knew at the time
she drowned her children that her conduct was wrong.194 One psychi-
atrist was unable to arrive at a conclusion.195 Among the others, four
188. Deborah W. Denno, Who Is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 7–8 (2003).
189. Id. at 27–33; Faith McLellan, Mental Health and Justice: The Case of Andrea
Yates, 368 THE LANCET (Issue 9551) 1951–54 (Dec. 2, 2006), https://www.thelan-
cet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140673606697894/fulltext [https://perma.unl
.edu/HP4X-BA44].
190. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 217; Denno, supra note 188, at 32–33.
191. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 217–18; Denno, supra note 188, at 34.
192. TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.01 (1992). See Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 591–92 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008); Riley v. State, 830 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992);
Denno, supra note 188, at 16–17.
193. McLellan, supra note 189; Denno, supra note 188, at 37–38.
194. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 218.
195. Id. at 218 n.2.
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psychiatrists and the psychologist testified that Yates “did not know
right from wrong, was incapable of knowing what she did was wrong,
or believed that her acts were right.”196 The remaining psychiatrist,
“Dr. Park Dietz . . . was the State’s sole mental-health expert in the
case, [and] testified that [Yates], although psychotic on June 20, knew
that what she did was wrong.”197
In response to defense counsel’s questioning about his role as a
consultant for the television show Law & Order, Dr. Dietz volunteered
that an episode of that show which aired shortly before Yates drowned
her children featured “a woman with postpartum depression who
drowned her children in the bathtub and was found insane.”198 The
prosecutor subsequently sought to undermine the testimony of a de-
fense expert witness by inquiring about her failure to explore what
significance Yates might have attributed to the Law & Order show
referenced by Dr. Dietz.199 And during her closing argument to the
jury, the prosecutor suggested that viewing the Law & Order episode
offered Yates “a way out” from her depression and troubled thoughts:
“[S]he watches ‘Law & Order’ regularly, she sees this program. There
is a way out. She tells that to Dr. Dietz. A way out.”200 The jury re-
jected Yates’s insanity defense and convicted her of both capital mur-
der charges.
Following the guilty verdicts, but before the jurors began their pen-
alty-phase deliberations to determine whether Yates should be sen-
tenced to death or life imprisonment, it was discovered that Dr. Dietz’s
testimony was erroneous: no Law & Order episode depicting what he
described had ever been presented. Defense counsel’s motion for a
mistrial was denied. The jury was informed about the erroneous testi-
mony via a stipulation and it ultimately rejected the prosecution’s re-
quest for the death penalty. Yates accordingly was sentenced to life
imprisonment.201 In 2005, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed
Yates’s convictions, concluding that “there is a reasonable likelihood
that Dr. Dietz’s false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury.”202
Yates’s retrial began in June 2006. She again entered pleas of not
guilty by reason of insanity. The prosecution elected not to seek the
196. Id. at 218 (footnote omitted).
197. Id. at 218.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 219.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 219–20. See generally Edward Wyatt, Even for an Expert, Blurred TV
Images Become a False Reality, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2005), https://www.nytimes
.com/2005/01/08/arts/television/even-for-an-expert-blurred-tv-images-became-a-
false-reality.html [https://perma.unl.edu/Z4AH-Q64W].
202. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 222.
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death penalty.203 As a consequence, the jurors did not have to be
death-qualified, i.e., attest to their willingness to consider imposing a
capital sentence in the event of a conviction.204 Research suggests
that, in addition to exhibiting other “conviction-proneness” tendencies,
death-qualified juries generally are less receptive to the insanity de-
fense than juries that are not death-qualified.205 At the conclusion of
the month-long retrial, the jurors deliberated for nearly thirteen hours
and then found Yates not guilty by reason of insanity.206 Yates was
civilly committed and, as of 2018, remained hospitalized.207
IV. WHAT WENT WRONG? SOURCES OF ERROR IN FAILED
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE EXONERATION CASES
A. Failed Self-Defense
We can compare the frequency with which different types of
problems were evident in the failed justification (self-defense) cases
we discussed and in the larger body of analogous exoneration cases
identified in the National Registry of Exonerations (NRE). Our sample
of nineteen cases208 is not representative of NRE cases generally. Our
cases are exclusively “no crime” wrongful convictions, and all concern
convictions for murder (eleven of nineteen, or 57.9%), attempted mur-
203. Andrea Yates Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity—Prosecutors Had Origi-
nally Sought Death, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 27, 2006), https://death
penaltyinfo.org/node/444 [https://perma.unl.edu/RJR9-NKUR].
204. “[A] prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on
capital punishment . . . [if those] views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath.’” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
205. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of In-
sanity, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984); see generally William C. Thompson et al.,
Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes
Into Verdicts, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984); see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162 (1986) (stating that death-qualified juries are more “conviction-prone”).
206. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 203; McLellan, supra note 189; Maria
Newman, Yates Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, N.Y. TIMES (July 26,
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/26/us/26cnd-yates.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/FT47-V6Q5]; Yates Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, CNN (July 26,
2006), http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/07/26/yates.verdict/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
E3K4-EEB2].
207. Where is Andrea Yates Now? A Peek Inside Her Life in a State Mental Hospital,
ABC 13 EYEWITNESS NEWS (June 20, 2018), https://abc13.com/where-is-andrea-
yates-now-peek-inside-her-secluded-life/1980992/ [https://perma.unl.edu/T9W6-
CUNM]; see also George Parham, Beyond the Andrea Yates Verdict: Mental
Health and the Law, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 847, 858 (2017) (stating “[Andrea
Yates] is currently in a mental health hospital and will come up for yearly review
to determine whether she constitutes a danger to others.”).
208. We include Jacob Gentry’s case, see supra Part II, and the eighteen cases dis-
cussed, see supra section III.A.
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der (two, or 10.5%), manslaughter (three, or 15.8%), or assault (three,
or 15.8%). In contrast, just 36.8% of the post-1988 exonerations in-
cluded in the NRE involve “no crime” wrongful convictions, and among
those, considerably smaller proportions represent convictions for mur-
der (8.0%), attempted murder (0.5%), manslaughter (2.2%), or assault
(5.3%).209 The race and ethnicity of the nineteen exonerees in our
sample (73.7% White; 21.1% Black; 5.3% Hispanic; 0% Other) and in
the 146 NRE “no crime” cases involving murder, attempted murder,
manslaughter, and assault (66.0% White; 20.8% Black; 10.4% His-
panic; 2.8% Other) are roughly comparable.210
The NRE identifies the “contributing factors” associated with the
wrongful convictions in its database. Those factors include mistaken
witness identification (MWI), false confession (FC), perjury or false ac-
cusation (P/FA), false or misleading forensic evidence (F/MFE), official
misconduct (OM), and inadequate legal defense (ILD).211 Many cases
involve multiple contributing factors, while in some of the wrongful
conviction cases no contributing factors are identified. Table 1 de-
scribes the frequency with which the various contributing factors are
present in all 2,471 of the exoneration cases; in the 910 “no crime”
cases; in the 146 “no crime” cases involving convictions for murder,
attempted murder, manslaughter, or assault; and in the nineteen
cases in our sample of failed self-defense cases (all of which are “no
crime” wrongful convictions for murder, attempted murder, man-
slaughter, or assault).212
209. These calculations were based on NRE data current as of July 2, 2019, at which
time 910 of the 2,471 NRE exonerations were identified as “no crime” cases, and
73 of the 910 “no crime” cases involved convictions for murder, 5 for attempted
murder, 20 for manslaughter, and 48 for assault. See NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERA-
TIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx
[https://perma.unl.edu/KA8K-8DAG] (last visited July 2, 2019).
210. Id.
211. Id. The contributing factors are defined at Glossary, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERA-
TIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx#MWI
D [https://perma.unl.edu/KY6J-N5JE] (last visited May 29, 2019) (defining con-
tributing factors).
212. The reported statistics are current as of July 2, 2019. See NAT’L REGISTRY EXON-
ERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?
View={FAF6EDDB-5A68-4F8F-8A52-2C61F5BF9EA7}&FilterClear=1 [https://
perma.unl.edu/R3QJ-6F7J] (last visited July 2, 2019).
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Table 1
Frequency with Which Factors Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions in NRE Cases
Factor MWI FC P/FA F/MFE OM ILD None 
All Cases 
(N=2,471) 
28.5% 12.1% 58.2% 23.0% 53.5% 25.7% 5.4% 
No Crime 
(N=910) 
0.2% 4.6% 61.2% 28.8% 42.1% 24.5% 11.1% 
No Crime  
+ Murder, 
Att., M.S.,  
Assault 
(N=146) 





0% 0% 47.4% 21.1% 52.6% 36.7% 21.4% 
Significant differences exist in the prevalence of the individual fac-
tors contributing to wrongful convictions among all of the NRE cases
and the nineteen failed self-defense cases in our sample. Not surpris-
ingly, none of the failed self-defense cases involved mistaken witness
identifications, a factor present in more than one-fourth (28.5%) of all
exoneration cases. Nor did any defendants in the failed self-defense
cases falsely confess, in contrast to 12.1% of the defendants in the
larger body of exoneration cases. Inadequate legal defense contributed
more often to the wrongful convictions in the failed self-defense cases
than others (36.7% versus 25.7%), while perjury and false accusations
were somewhat less prevalent (47.4% versus 58.2%). Interestingly, a
noticeably higher proportion of the failed self-defense cases (21.4%)
than exoneration cases generally (5.4%) were marked by the absence
of factors commonly associated with wrongful convictions.213 Al-
213. See Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173,
186 (2008) (“There is a canonical list of factors that lead to false convictions: eye-
witness misidentification; false confession; misleading, false, or fraudulent foren-
sic evidence; testimony by highly motivated police informants such as ‘jailhouse
snitches’; perjury in general; prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective legal de-
fense.”); Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful
Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 841
(2010) (“[R]esearch has identified seven central categories of sources [of wrongful
convictions], including problems involving (1) mistaken eyewitness identification;
(2) false confessions; (3) tunnel vision; (4) informant testimony; (5) imperfect fo-
rensic science; (6) prosecutorial misconduct; and (7) inadequate defense
representation.”).
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though our sample is small, this disparity suggests the importance of
probing for other sources of error to explain wrongful convictions in
failed self-defense cases.
In our sample of failed self-defense cases, the erroneous exclusion
of evidence of the alleged victim’s prior acts of violence or reputation
for violence—which may be relevant to whether the alleged victim was
the initial aggressor and whether the defendant actually and reasona-
bly believed it was necessary to resort to defensive force—or a related
flawed jury instruction, contributed to reversals with some regularity
and, by hypothesis, to the wrongful convictions. These problems arose
in five of the nineteen cases.214 Several other cases also involved er-
rors primarily or exclusively related to self-defense issues. In one, the
trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that under state law the
resident of a dwelling has no duty to retreat prior to using deadly de-
fensive force within the dwelling against a cohabitant.215 In one of the
two wrongful convictions for misdemeanor assault in our sample, the
trial judge failed to instruct the jury on self-defense when such an in-
struction was merited.216 In the other, the trial judge left the bench
during the defendant’s offer of proof regarding the alleged victim’s
demonstrated history of ill will against him, which was relevant to the
self-defense claim.217 In another case, the judge presiding at a murder
trial failed to instruct the jury that self-defense was available not only
for the murder charge, but also for the lesser included offense of man-
slaughter.218 And in another case, the prosecutor erroneously repre-
sented to the jury that state law prohibited the use of deadly defensive
force when the alleged victim was unarmed.219
Cases that hinge on the acceptance or rejection of self-defense
claims are not immune to the more common sources of error that con-
tribute to wrongful convictions generally. In several cases within our
sample, reversals stemmed from problems other than evidentiary or
doctrinal issues exclusive to self-defense. They instead involved fac-
tors commonly found to contribute to the general lot of wrongful con-
victions, including false testimony,220 prosecutorial misconduct,221
214. Antoine v. State, 138 So. 3d 1064, 1074–76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Common-
wealth v. Chambers, 989 N.E.2d 483, 489–95 (Mass. 2013); State v. Fish, 213
P.3d 258, 263–75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Lewchuk, 4 Neb. App. 165,
170–78, 539 N.W.2d 847, 852–56 (1995); Richardson v. State, 147 So. 3d 838,
839–44 (Miss. 2014).
215. State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1342–43 (Ohio 1997).
216. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Podaras v. City of Menlo Park, supra note 115,
at *9.
217. State v. McMahan, 761 A.2d 50, 53–55 (Me. 2000).
218. State v. Gentry, 106 A.3d 552, 558–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
219. Drennen v. State, 311 P.3d 116, 121–23 (Wyo. 2013).
220. Cash v. State, 875 So. 2d 829, 830–31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
221. Gentry, 106 A.3d at 562–65 (improper questioning about inadmissible evidence);
Sandra Ortiz, supra note 113 (improper closing argument); Sailors v. State, 593
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problems relating to expert testimony,222 and ineffective assistance of
defense counsel,223 among others.224
Although deficient jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and other
case-specific errors often contribute to wrongful convictions when self-
defense is at issue, the doctrinal and principled choices that demar-
cate the bounds of lawful self-defense can be the fundamental deter-
minants of innocence and guilt in this context. These choices reflect
normative judgments concerning the circumstances under which citi-
zens are justified in using defensive force, how much defensive force
can be employed, and how the risk of error is best allocated when self-
defense is at issue. They do so through provisions of law that are more
or less permissive in defining when citizens are authorized to use de-
fensive force, and that are more or less demanding in their proof
requirements.
Jurisdictions vary, for example, in whether a law-abiding person
has a duty to retreat before using deadly defensive force against an
unlawful aggressor.225 The use of deadly force in self-defense is less
readily available in states that abide by the common law duty to re-
treat, a rule designed to preserve life, even that of an unlawful aggres-
sor, absent necessity.226 In contrast, in “stand your ground”
N.E.2d 202, 205–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (improper closing argument); Williams v.
State, 298 S.E.2d 492, 493–94 (Ga. 1983) (failure to disclose material exculpatory
evidence); Williams v. State, 330 S.E.2d 353, 355–56 (Ga. 1985) (improper closing
argument).
222. People v. Salce, 1 N.Y.S.3d 417, 420–21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (exclusion of de-
fense witness expert testimony regarding defensive nature of wounds); Williams,
330 S.E.2d at 354–55 (improper admission of prosecution expert witness testi-
mony because subject matter was not beyond the ken of average lay jurors).
223. Cash, 875 So. 2d at 832; People v. Holbrook, No. 271562, 2008 WL 2917641, at
*2–3 (Mich. Ct. App. July 29, 2008).
224. People v. Gurley, 602 N.Y.S.2d 184 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (newly discovered evi-
dence); State v. Linder, 278 S.E.2d 335 (S.C. 1981) (failure to instruct jury on
lesser included offense of manslaughter in murder trial); Roesser v. State, 751
S.E.2d 297 (Ga. 2013) (reversal for unspecified erroneous jury instruction).
225. A slim majority of states (twenty-seven) generally impose no duty to retreat
before deadly defensive force is used by a person who was not the original aggres-
sor, although the rule has varied application when the circumstances involve the
co-inhabitants of a dwelling. Twenty-two states impose a duty to retreat before
deadly defensive force is utilized when retreat can be made in complete safety.
Two jurisdictions consider whether safe retreat was available using a totality of
the circumstances analysis. See Alon Lagstein, Beyond the George Zimmerman
Trial: The Duty to Retreat and Those Who Contribute to Their Own Need to Use
Deadly Self-Defense, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 367, 373–79 (2014); see
also Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat When Not on One’s Own Premises, 18
A.L.R. 1279 (1922 & Supp.) (discussing the duty to retreat based on jurisdiction);
Self-Defense and “Stand Your Ground,” NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/self-defense-and-stand-your-
ground.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/8S75-UU2Y] (last visited June 3, 2019).
226. See Richard Stephens, Life and Liberty: Seven Factors That Will Better Evaluate
Self-Defense in Nevada’s Common Law on Retreat, 8 NEV. L.J. 649, 651–52
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jurisdictions, the law promotes the policy that innocent citizens need
not yield to lawbreakers, and thus may use deadly force to defend
against threatened death or serious injury even if an avenue of safe
retreat is available.227 As a consequence, whether retreat is a prereq-
uisite to the use of deadly defensive force may be determinative of
guilt or innocence in courts of law.
Other measures also may tip the scales of guilt or innocence when
self-defense is at issue. Several states have enacted legislation that
creates a presumption that persons claiming to have acted in self-de-
fense under qualifying circumstances had a reasonable fear of immi-
nent death or great bodily harm, and bar arrest, prosecution, or
conviction (as well as civil liability) unless that presumption is rebut-
ted. Florida’s legislation,228 enacted in 2005 and supported by the Na-
tional Rifle Association and the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC),229 serves as a model followed in whole or in part
elsewhere.230
The states now overwhelmingly mandate that the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to act
in justifiable self-defense when self-defense is at issue.231 Defendants
(2008); Michael Jaffe, Up in Arms Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law,
30 NOVA L. REV. 155, 160 (2005); DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 243–45; WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7(f), 497–99 (3d ed. 2000); FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 28, at 857–64.
227. See RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY (1991); Stephens, supra note 226, at 652–53;
DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 243–45; LAFAVE, supra note 226, at 497–99;
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 28, at 860–64.
228. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 776.013, 776.032 (West 2017). See generally Lydia
Zbrzeznj, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting Citizens to
Arm Themselves and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 231, 253–57 (2012).
229. See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws,
67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 836–39 (2013); Zachary L. Weaver, Florida’s “Stand
Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for Clarification, 63 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 395, 396 (2008); John Nichols, How ALEC Took Florida’s “License
to Kill” Law National, THE NATION (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/
article/how-alec-took-floridas-license-kill-law-national/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
XEM8-BTZP].
230. See Jennifer Randolph, How to Get Away With Murder: Criminal Law and Civil
Immunity Provisions in “Stand Your Ground” Legislation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV.
599, 611–16 (2014); Wyatt Holliday, “The Answer to Criminal Aggression is Retal-
iation”: Stand-Your-Ground Laws and the Liberalization of Self-Defense, 43 U.
TOL. L. REV. 407, 413–21 (2012); “Stand Your Ground” Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/
guns-in-public/stand-your-ground-laws/ [https://perma.unl.edu/2GWG-CWDW]
(last visited June 3, 2019).
231. In 2019, Ohio became perhaps the last state to require the prosecution to prove
that a defendant did not act in lawful self-defense after the legislature overrode
Governor John Kasich’s veto of legislation, which shifted the burden of persua-
sion to the government. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (West 2019); Mike
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are often required to satisfy the burden of persuasion to prevail on
other affirmative defenses,232 and there is no constitutional bar to
having them do so with respect to self-defense.233 The near universal
agreement that the prosecution must negate self-defense claims re-
flects a value judgment reminiscent of the Blackstonian principle that
“it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suf-
fer,”234 and is akin to the corresponding rationale underlying the con-
stitutional imperative that the government must prove all elements of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt to establish guilt.235 It demon-
strates consensus that special caution is needed to guard against the
Brookbank, New Ohio Self-Defense Law Shifts Burden of Proof to Prosecutors,
NEWS 5 CLEV. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/local-news/
cleveland-metro/new-ohio-self-defense-law-shifts-burden-of-proof-to-prosecutors
[https://perma.unl.edu/J2HM-NADT]; Andy Chow, Ohio House, Senate Override
Kasich Veto on Self-Defense Gun Bill, CIN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://www.wvxu.org/post/ohio-house-senate-override-kasich-veto-self-defense-
gun-bill#stream/0 [https://perma.unl.edu/ZX2U-U3U3]; James Dearie, Major
Change in Ohio Self-Defense Cases for Criminal Defendants, DEARIE, FISCHER &
MATTHEWS, https://www.dfm-law.com/blog/2019/04/major-change-in-ohio-self-de-
fense-cases-for-criminal-defendants.shtml [https://perma.unl.edu/EK9F-PCZZ]
(last visited June 4, 2019) (“Up until the passage of this law [shifting the burden
of proof from the defendant to the prosecution in self-defense cases], Ohio was the
only state in the Union that laid the burden of proof on the defendant to prove
that an act was committed in self-defense.”); see also Amber L. Kipfmiller, Exam-
ining Retaliation as a Use of Force: Why State Courts Should Return to the Pre-
Nassar, Pro-Plaintiff Framework, 87 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 1, 22–24 (2018); Annota-
tion, Homicide: Modern Status of Rules as to Burden and Quantum of Proof to
Show Self-Defense, 43 A.L.R.3d 221 § 5[b] (1972 & Supp.) (examining a selection
of cases where courts stated the rules regarding who has the burden of showing
self-defense in a homicide prosecution); Homicide, 40A AM. JUR.2d § 236 (2019)
(discussing the presumptions and inferences that occur in homicide cases).
232. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714 (2013); Dixon v. United States,
548 U.S. 1 (2006); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790 (1952). See generally George Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A
Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE
L.J. 880, 899–910 (1968); Robinson, supra note 29, at 256–62; LAFAVE, supra note
226, at 53–59; DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 236.
233. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
234. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. See generally Robert J. Norris et
al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer”: Evaluating State Safeguards Against
Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1301 (2011); Alexander Volokh, N Guilty
Men, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 173 (1997). Blackstone, however, was of the view that
criminal defendants were properly assigned the burden of persuasion on “defen-
sive” issues, including self-defense. FLETCHER, supra note 232, at 902–03; Brown,
supra note 227, at 3.
235. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In a
criminal case . . . we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent
man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty . . . . In
this context, I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a crim-
inal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it
is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”).
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erroneous rejection of legitimate self-defense claims and the attendant
risk of wrongful conviction.
Nevertheless, dangers lurk when claims of self-defense are in-
dulged too permissively. If not cabined by requirements that defensive
force is justified only when reasonably believed to be a necessary and
proportionate response to imminent unlawful injury,236 the law risks
condoning sanctioning the private use of violence too liberally,237 po-
tentially encompassing acts of vigilantism238 and accommodating seri-
ously misguided and idiosyncratic perceptions and beliefs.239 The
236. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ
AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 18–38 (1988).
237. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (“The killing of another
human being is the most extreme recourse to our inherent right of self-preserva-
tion and can be justified in law only by the utmost real or apparent necessity
brought about by the decedent . . . . Only if defendants are required to show that
they killed due to a reasonable belief that death or great bodily harm was immi-
nent can the justification for homicide remain clearly and firmly rooted in neces-
sity. The imminence requirement ensures that deadly force will be used only
where it is necessary as a last resort in the exercise of the inherent right of self-
preservation.”); FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 236, at 18 (“A
legal system is possible only if the state enjoys a monopoly of force. When private
individuals appeal to force and decide who shall enjoy the right to ‘life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness,’ there can be no pretense of the rule of law. Yet the
state’s monopoly also entails an obligation to secure its citizens against violence.
When individuals are threatened with immediate aggression, when the police
cannot protect them, the monopoly of the state gives way. The individual right of
survival reasserts itself. No inquiry could be more important than probing this
boundary between the state’s obligation to protect us and the individual’s right to
use force, even deadly force, to repel and disarm an aggressor.”).
238. See Lagstein, supra note 225, at 390–91, n.203–06; Ebonie R. Rocio, Flip a Coin:
Heads, Stand Your Ground Is Good Law . . . Tails, Stand Your Ground Is Bad
Law, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. ONLINE 3, 14, n.107 (2014); Devin C. Daines, State
v. Harden: Muddying the Waters of Self-Defense Laws in West Virginia, 113 W.
VA. L. REV. 971, 975, n.21 (2011); Adam Winkler, What the Florida “Stand Your
Ground” Law Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfor
debate/2012/03/21/do-stand-your-ground-laws-encourage-vigilantes/what-the-
florida-stand-your-ground-law-says [https://perma.unl.edu/5HQV-4JMQ].
239. For example, in affirming the requirement that a person’s belief that it is neces-
sary to defend against imminent unlawful conduct must be objectively reasona-
ble, the New York Court of Appeals explained:
We cannot lightly impute to the Legislature an intent to fundamentally
alter the principles of justification to allow the perpetrator of a serious
crime to go free simply because that person believed his actions were
reasonable and necessary to prevent some perceived harm. To com-
pletely exonerate such an individual, no matter how aberrational or bi-
zarre his thought patterns, would allow citizens to set their own
standards for the permissible use of force. It would also allow a legally
competent defendant suffering from delusions to kill or perform acts of
violence with impunity, contrary to fundamental principles of justice and
criminal law. We can only conclude that the Legislature retained a rea-
sonable requirement to avoid giving a license for such actions.
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. 1986).
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standards governing the justified use of defensive force must be sensi-
tive to these concerns while also ensuring that the boundaries of law-
ful self-defense are not unduly restrictive, so that law-abiding
individuals remain at liberty to defend themselves against unlawful
aggression without risking either harm or unjust conviction. Plumb-
ing this balance, to adequately protect innocents both outside and
within courts of law, is perhaps the fundamental principled challenge
in determining the proper scope and essentials of self-defense laws.
B. Failed Excuse Defenses
Although excuse and justification defenses both negate legal guilt,
they do so for different reasons. Actors whose conduct would otherwise
be criminal may be excused from responsibility because they suffer a
disabling condition—such as mental illness, youth, or threatened
harm—that negates blameworthiness and hence makes condemnation
and punishment inappropriate. The harm caused nevertheless re-
mains socially disapproved and is often tragically lamentable. In con-
trast, justification defenses reflect the social judgment that an actor’s
conduct was appropriate under the circumstances, representing ap-
proval of the ensuing decision to inflict harm as well.240 These funda-
mental differences may result in distinctive legal policies governing
excuse and justification defenses, including rules of evidence and pro-
cedure that are more or less tolerant of the erroneous rejection or ac-
ceptance of the respective defenses.
Our sample of three cases in which excuse defenses initially were
rejected, resulting in convictions for murder241 or attempted mur-
der,242 but which ultimately culminated in exonerations, is far too
small to illuminate factors that are apt to contribute to wrongful con-
victions generally in cases of failed excuse defenses. The errors result-
ing in the reversal of the convictions in our sample have no common
theme. One involved defense counsel’s failure to discover that a clerk
of court erred in reporting that the lawyer’s request to have a “sleep
study” conducted on his client in support of the asserted defense of
somnambulism had been denied.243 Another concerned a sheriff’s in-
appropriate contact with jury members during a trial at which the
sheriff testified that he perceived no evidence of the defendant’s
240. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 171–202 (discussing the cases of Erwin
Charles Simants and Andrea Yates).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 160–70 (discussing the case of Yun Hseng
Liao).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 162–67 (discussing the case of Yun Hseng
Liao).
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mental illness, which was integral to the asserted insanity defense.244
In the remaining case, a prosecution expert witness who disputed the
defendant’s claim of insanity presented false testimony that was
deemed prejudicial to the defense.245
Beyond case-specific issues, various rules and legal doctrines re-
flect a greater reluctance to recognize excuse defenses, and a higher
tolerance for the erroneous rejection of them, than is true for justifica-
tion defenses. There is a noticeable contrast, for example, between ju-
risdictions’ receptivity to the insanity defense, an excuse, and self-
defense, a form of justification. In most states and under federal law,
defendants now must satisfy the burden of persuasion to prevail on
the insanity defense,246 whereas the prosecution is required to negate
claims of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.247 In our samples of
cases, following Erwin Charles Simants’s acquittal by reason of in-
sanity in 1979, the Nebraska legislature changed the prior rule that
the prosecution must disprove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt and
required defendants to establish their insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence.248 Conversely, after Harold Fish was charged with mur-
der in a highly publicized and controversial case in which he claimed
to have killed in self-defense, the Arizona legislature changed the pre-
vailing law, which placed the burden on defendants to establish that
they acted in self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and
shifted the burden to the prosecution to disprove self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.249
Four states now have effectively abandoned the insanity defense,
making evidence of mental illness relevant only insofar as it bears on
the mens rea element of a charged crime.250 Other jurisdictions,
244. See supra text accompanying notes 179–81 (discussing the case of Erwin Charles
Simants).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 197–202 (discussing the case of Andrea
Yates).
246. See Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Burden and Sufficiency of Proof of
Mental Irresponsibility in Criminal Case, 17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968 & Supp.); The
Insanity Defense Among the States, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/crimin
al-procedure/the-insanity-defense-among-the-states.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
FSL8-C2R9] (last visited June 6, 2019); 18 U.S.C.A. § 17(b) (West 2018) (“The
defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.”).
247. See supra text accompanying note 231.
248. See supra text accompanying note 185.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 69–70.
250. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (West 2018);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West
2018). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Kansas’s aboli-
tion of the insanity defense is constitutionally permissible. Kahler v. Kansas, 139
S. Ct. 1318 (2019). See generally Fatma Marouf, Assumed Sane, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. ONLINE 25, 32–33 (2016); R. Michael Shoptaw, M’Naghten is a Fundamental
Right: Why Abolishing the Traditional Insanity Defense Violates Due Process, 84
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spurred by John Hinckley, Jr.’s acquittal by reason of insanity follow-
ing his attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan,251 restricted
the availability of the insanity defense, such as by recognizing only
“severe”252 mental illness as a predicate, or narrowing the circum-
stances under which the defense applies.253 The trend is otherwise
with respect to self-defense, as several jurisdictions in recent years
significantly expanded the availability of the justifiable use of defen-
sive force and adopted correspondingly permissive evidentiary
rules.254
The direction and magnitude of the risk of error in criminal prose-
cutions that hinge on the rejection or acceptance of affirmative de-
fenses will vary depending on the procedural rules governing their
recognition, as well as their substantive scope. For example, when
“the defendant bears the burden of proof on an affirmative insanity
defense, there is less risk that he will erroneously be excused from
liability.”255 By the same token, however, the risk is thereby enhanced
that a meritorious defense will be rejected.256 And while limiting the
MISS. L.J. 1101, 1111–12 (2015) (including Alaska as one of the states that abol-
ished the insanity defense); Jessica Harrison, Idaho’s Abolition of the Insanity
Defense—An Ineffective, Costly, and Unconstitutional Eradication, 51 IDAHO L.
REV. 575, 584–86 (2015).
251. See PETER W. LOW, JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR. & RICHARD L. BONNIE, THE TRIAL
OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1986); LIN-
COLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.
(1984); Elizabeth Bennion, Death is Different No Longer: Abolishing the Insanity
Defense is Cruel and Unusual Under Graham v. Florida, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
1–2 (2011); Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from Me”:
The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Cul-
ture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1376–77, 1380–82 (1997); Robinson &
Cahill, supra note 30, at 207.
252. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (1992); see supra text accompanying note 192; 18
U.S.C.A. § 17(a) (West 2018).
253. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to
Arizona’s restrictive insanity defense). See generally J. Robert Russell, Criminal
Discovery and Psychological Defenses in West Virginia: “Squeezing a Lemon” or
“Kicking a Dog,” 99 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 214–15 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, Un-
packing the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 639–40 (1990).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 227–30.
255. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 25, Clark
v. Arizona 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (No. 05-5966), 2006 WL 542415, at *25.
256. See DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 236 (“[A] strong case can be made for the proposi-
tion that the government should carry the burden of persuasion regarding justifi-
cation defenses, but that the defendant should be required to persuade the
factfinder regarding excuses.” This argument is based on the premise that
“[s]ociety has determined [that justified conduct] is desirable or, at least permis-
sible. In short, it is lawful conduct. If the defendant is allocated the burden of
persuasion regarding a justification, she may be punished although the jury is
not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she has done anything wrong. In
contrast, with excused conduct, all of the elements of the crime have been proven
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reach of the insanity defense or the lawful use of defensive force will
presumably result in fewer persons escaping responsibility who de-
serve conviction and punishment, such restrictions can be expected to
place more individuals at risk who are not truly blameworthy.257
In short, case-specific errors can and will produce wrongful convic-
tions that result when legitimate affirmative defenses fail. At the
same time, the particular terms and the proof requirements of justifi-
cation and excuse defenses warrant careful attention. The governing
doctrinal and evidentiary policies are critical in allocating the compet-
ing risks of error inherent in adjudicating affirmative defenses, and in
attempting to further “the twofold aim of [law] which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer.”258
V. COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION
AND INCARCERATION
As with a majority of the states, Nebraska provided a statutory
basis to allow wrongfully convicted individuals who have been incar-
cerated to recover damages for harms suffered.259 Such legislation
and it has been determined that the conduct was unjustifiable. Under those cir-
cumstances, it is fair to expect the defendant to persuade the jury that she is not
to blame for her wrongful conduct.” (emphasis in original)).
257. In his seminal article published in 1982, before many of the developments dis-
cussed above which concern affirmative defenses were enacted, Professor Robin-
son noted:
many jurisdictions . . . place[ ] the burden on the state for all conditions
that establish the harmfulness of the conduct and the blameworthiness
of the defendant. Since justifications and excuses go to establish this
“rightness of punishing the accused,” the burden of persuasion for such
defenses is likely to fall to the state under this view.
Robinson, supra note 29, at 260 (footnotes omitted) (quoting MCCORMICK’S HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 802 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)).
See generally Susan D. Rozelle, Fear and Loathing in Insanity Law: Explain-
ing the Otherwise Inexplicable Clark v. Arizona, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19,
24–26 (2007) (arguing that abolishing the insanity defense would undermine the
fundamental principle that moral culpability is a prerequisite for punishment);
Joshua G. Light, The Castle Doctrine—The Lobby is My Dwelling, 22 WIDENER
L.J. 219, 225 (2012) (noting that one reason for the expansion of self-defense laws
is the belief that “the justice system favors due process rights of criminals over
the rights of victims”) (footnote omitted); Maria Massucci & James A. Pitaro, Vic-
timization as a Defense: Valid Protection for the Innocent or Escape from Crimi-
nal Responsibility?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 305 (1992).
258. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See generally James R. Acker,
Reliable Justice: Advancing the Twofold Aim of Establishing Guilt and Protecting
the Innocent, 82 ALB. L. REV. 719 (2019).
259. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia, as well as the federal govern-
ment, currently have enacted such compensation statutes. A helpful chart identi-
fying the state and federal statutes that authorize compensation for wrongfully
convicted and incarcerated individuals is available at Compensation Chart by
State—22 May 2018, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/Compensation.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/FHZ3-
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aims to recognize that the innocent victims of miscarriages of justice
are entitled to compensation for their losses without having to navi-
gate the considerable obstacles and uncertainties associated with pur-
suing other remedies such as lawsuits or private compensation
bills.260 The legislative findings that introduce Nebraska’s law, en-
acted in 2009, detail its rationale:
The Legislature finds that innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted
of crimes and subsequently imprisoned have been uniquely victimized, have
distinct problems reentering society, and have difficulty achieving legal re-
dress due to a variety of substantive and technical obstacles in the law. The
Legislature also finds that such persons should have an available avenue of
redress. In light of the particular and substantial horror of being imprisoned
for a crime one did not commit, the Legislature intends by enactment of the
Nebraska Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment Act that persons
who can demonstrate that they were wrongfully convicted shall have a claim
against the state as provided in the act.261
To recover damages under the law, a claimant must prove by clear
and convincing evidence “[t]hat he or she was innocent of the crime or
crimes”262 underlying the conviction and imprisonment.
But there is a catch. Individuals wrongfully convicted and incarcer-
ated following a failed self-defense claim need not apply. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court so ruled while considering a claim for damages
under the act brought by Charlene Marie, who had been pardoned fol-
lowing her convictions and service of two years in prison for using a
deadly weapon to commit a felony and making terroristic threats.263
The convictions were based on Marie shooting her husband, Kurt Old-
enburg, during an incident in which Marie “pointed a gun at [Olden-
PZAP] (last visited June 13, 2019). Although most of the information on the chart
is accurate and current, Indiana and Nevada recently adopted compensation stat-
utes that are not included. See Ind. House Enrolled Act, No. 1150 (codified as IND.
CODE § 5-2-23 (2019)); Assemb. Bill No. 267, 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019). See generally
Nevada Governor Signs the Strongest Compensation Law in the Country, INNO-
CENCE PROJECT (June 15, 2019), https://www.innocenceproject.org/nevada-govern
or-signs-the-strongest-compensation-law-in-the-country/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
NF8G-Y7CJ]. The amount of monetary awards and other forms of compensation
vary dramatically among jurisdictions. See Jeffrey S. Gutman, An Empirical Re-
examination of State Statutory Compensation for the Wrongly Convicted, 82 MO.
L. REV. 369 (2017); Alanna Trivelli, Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted: A
Proposal to Make Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Whole Again, 19 RICHMOND
J.L. & PUB. INT. 257, 260–64 (2016).
260. See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73 (1999); see also Adele Bernhard, Justice Still
Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Un-
justly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 82 DRAKE L. REV. 703 (2004) (discussing
jurisdictions with laws in place to compensate individuals who were unjustly con-
victed and later exonerated).
261. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4602 (Reissue 2009).
262. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4603(3) (Reissue 2009). Claimants must also establish three
additional matters. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4603(1), (2), (4) (Reissue 2009).
263. Marie v. State, 302 Neb. 217, 922 N.W.2d 733 (2019).
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burg], he charged her, and while doing so he was shot and seriously
injured.”264 The couple’s marriage was described as a “stormy rela-
tionship . . . and mutual tormenting in ways many people would find
abusive.”265
In seeking compensation for wrongful conviction and incarceration
following her pardon, Marie alleged that she was innocent of the al-
leged crimes because she acted in self-defense.266 Her claim was prop-
erly dismissed, the court ruled, because a person acting in self-defense
is not “innocent of the crime or crimes,”267 as contemplated by the
statute. Although acting in self-defense may support a claim of “legal
innocence,” the court reasoned, it fails to establish “actual inno-
cence,”268 a prerequisite for recovery under the compensation law. In
a prior case, the court “defined actual innocence to mean that the ‘de-
fendant did not commit the crime for which he or she is charged.’”269
Relying on this and other precedent, the court concluded that “actual
innocence is akin to factual innocence—in other words, where the
State has convicted the wrong person.”270 The court stressed that
“Marie does not allege that someone else shot Oldenburg or that she is
264. State v. Oldenburg, 10 Neb. App. 104, 628 N.W.2d 278, 280 (2001). At the time of
her conviction, Marie went under the name Charlene M. Oldenburg. See Marie,
302 Neb. at 218 n.2, 922 N.W.2d at 734–36 n.2.
265. Oldenburg, 10 Neb. App. at 106, 628 N.W.2d at 280.
266. Marie, 302 Neb. at 223, 922 N.W.2d at 738 (“Marie alleges that she was actually
innocent of the crime for which she was convicted, because she acted in self-de-
fense and thus had not formed the requisite intent.”). At her 1999 trial, she had
been charged with felonious assault, making a terroristic threat, and with using
a deadly weapon in the commission of both crimes. No self-defense instruction
had been given regarding the assault charge.
The jury was . . . instructed on the elements of terroristic threats, and a
self-defense instruction was given for that crime . . . . The jury found
Charlene not guilty of first-degree assault, guilty of making a terroristic
threat, and guilty of using a gun to commit a felony.
Oldenburg, 10 Neb. App. at 109–10, 628 N.W.2d at 283.
267. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4603(3) (Reissue 2009).
268. Marie, 302 Neb. at 225, 922 N.W.2d at 739 (“Marie alleges that she acted in self-
defense. This defense does not inform her claim of actual innocence, but is rele-
vant to a claim of legal innocence.”).
269. Id. at 222, 922 N.W.2d at 738 (quoting Hess v. State, 287 Neb. 559, 843 N.W.2d
648, 653 (2014)).
270. Id. at 224, 922 N.W.2d at 739. In support of this conclusion, the court relied on its
decision in Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 264 Neb. 558, 650 N.W.2d 237 (2002), which
rejected a defendant’s claim of malpractice against an attorney based on the the-
ory that the lawyer had not argued that she was innocent of assault because she
acted in self-defense. The court in Rodriguez v. Nielsen noted that the plaintiff
did not allege that she was absent at the time of the incident or that she
did not commit the acts which occurred. Instead, [the plaintiff] alleged
she committed the acts but the acts were in self-defense. In the context
of this civil malpractice action, these allegations of fact do not demon-
strate actual innocence.
Id. at 241, 650 N.W.2d at 562.
2020] “I DID IT, BUT . . . I DIDN’T” 635
otherwise factually innocent, but alleges that she acted in self-defense
and that her actions lacked the requisite intent. This is insufficient to
allege that she was innocent”271 to qualify for statutory compensation.
Consider the irony of this ruling. Had Marie been elsewhere—per-
haps relaxing on a beach—and mistakenly identified by an eyewitness
as firing the shot that wounded Oldenburg and then convicted and
incarcerated, she would be considered innocent and entitled to com-
pensation under the statute. But if instead of being elsewhere, out of
harm’s way, she was at imminent risk of death or serious injury while
under unlawful attack—which she reasonably believed required her to
defend herself or be killed by a violent assailant—and thus wounded
Oldenburg in justifiable self-defense, she is not eligible for compensa-
tion for the two years of incarceration resulting from the erroneous
rejection of her self-defense claim. The incongruity of these outcomes
is beyond ironic—it is indefensible both in principle and on policy
grounds.
Construing analogous provisions of their states’ wrongful convic-
tion compensation statutes, courts in other jurisdictions rejected argu-
ments that claimants who acted in self-defense are for that reason
disqualified from recovering damages.272 For instance, Ohio’s law re-
quires individuals seeking compensation to demonstrate, among other
matters, “that the offense of which the individual was found guilty . . .
was not committed by the individual or that no offense was committed
by any person.”273 Reasoning that one who acts in self-defense has
committed no “offense,” the Ohio Supreme Court concluded “that a
person acquitted by reason of self-defense may seek compensation for
wrongful imprisonment” under the state’s act.274
Under California law, a claimant must prove “that the crime with
which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or, if
committed, was not committed by him or her . . . .”275 This require-
ment, the California Court of Appeal ruled, does not preclude recovery
for wrongful conviction and incarceration by one who acted in self-de-
fense. “Murder and manslaughter are defined as unlawful killing. A
person who kills in lawful self-defense does not do the definitional ‘act’
of either crime. A person innocent because of justifiable homicide can
271. Marie, 302 Neb. at 225, 922 N.W.2d at 739.
272. See Annotation, Construction and Application of State Statutes Providing Com-
pensation for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration, 53 A.L.R. 6th 305 § 11
(2010 & Supp.).
273. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019).
274. Walden v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ohio 1989) (construing OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2748(A)(4) (West 2019), which subsequently was revised with the relevant
wording retained in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019)).
275. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903(a) (West 2014).
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demonstrate the crime charged ‘was not committed at all,’ ”276 and
thus may be eligible for compensation under the statute.
By their terms, the compensation statutes in some states effec-
tively prevent persons from recovering damages if they were wrong-
fully convicted because their self-defense claims were erroneously
rejected. Thus, the laws in Missouri277 and Montana278 restrict com-
pensation to wrongfully convicted individuals who demonstrate their
innocence through DNA evidence, which will almost always be irrele-
vant in self-defense cases because identity is not at issue. Statutes in
other states arguably, although less certainly, render compensation
unavailable in failed self-defense wrongful conviction cases. Legisla-
tion in some jurisdictions requires that innocence must be demon-
strated through “newly discovered evidence.”279 Such a requirement
introduces ambiguity into whether recovery is allowed in failed self-
defense cases when, for example, an acquittal or dismissal results af-
ter the original conviction was upset because of erroneous jury in-
structions, improper arguments, or other circumstances that do not
directly concern the discovery of new evidence.
In still other jurisdictions, statutes require proof that the individ-
ual seeking compensation “committed neither the act nor the offense
that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration.”280 These
276. Diola v. Bd. of Control, 185 Cal. Rptr. 511, 515–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
277. MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.058(1) (West 2016) (“[A]ny individual who was found guilty
of a felony in a Missouri court and was later determined to be actually innocent of
such crime solely as a result of DNA profiling analysis may be paid restitution.”).
278. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214(1) (West 2019) (“[A] person who was convicted in
this state of a felony offense, who was incarcerated in a state prison for any pe-
riod of time, and whose judgment of conviction was overturned by a court based
on the results of postconviction forensic DNA testing that exonerates the person
of the crime for which the person was convicted is entitled to receive educational
aid at the state’s expense.”). Educational assistance is the sole form of compensa-
tion available under the statute.
279. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 8-301(a), (b)(3), (f)(2)(ii) (West 2018); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1752(b), 691.1754(1)(c), 691.1755(1)(c) (West 2017);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-401.5(1), (3), 78B-9-402 (2)(a)(i), (v), 78B-9-404 (4)(a),
(8)(b) (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.3(A)(iv) (biological evidence of ac-
tual innocence), 19.2-327.11 (A)(iii)-(viii), 19.2-327.13 (non-biological evidence of
actual innocence) (West 2013). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(c)
(West 2013) (claimant must be “(i) . . . pardoned consistent with innocence for the
felony or felonies that are the basis for the claim; or (ii) [t]he claimant’s judgment
of conviction was reversed or vacated and the charging document dismissed on
the basis of significant new exculpatory information or, if a new trial was ordered
pursuant to the presentation of significant new exculpatory information, either
the claimant was found not guilty at the new trial or the claimant was not retried
and the charging document dismissed.”).
280. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.03(7)(a) (West 2017) (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 961.02(7) (West 2017). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-102(3)(a) (West
2013) (“The person committed neither the act or offense that served as the basis
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provisions stand in contrast to more commonly worded laws that allow
recovery if the person failed to commit either the act or an offense,281
or which condition recovery simply on proof that no crime or offense
was committed.282 Of course, even statutes of the latter type do not
for the conviction and incarceration that is the subject of the petition, nor any
lesser included offense thereof”); Assemb. Bill No. 267, 80th Sess. § 2(2) (Nev.
2019) (“The court shall award damages for wrongful conviction . . . if the person
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . (b) He or she did not commit
the felony for which he or she was convicted and the person . . . (2) Did not com-
mit the acts that were the basis of the conviction . . . .”).
281. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-422(a)(4) (West 2017) (“the person did not commit
any of the acts charged or the person’s acts or omissions in connection with such
charge constituted no offense . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(1)(b) (West 2019)
(“He did not commit the felony or felonies for which he was sentenced and which
are the grounds for the complaint, or the acts or omissions for which he was sen-
tenced did not constitute a felony”); N.Y. Ct. Claims Act § 8-b(5)(c) (2007) (“he did
not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument or his acts or
omissions charged . . . did not constitute a felony or misdemeanor against the
state”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2513 (a)(2) (West 2004) (“He did not commit any of the acts
charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge consti-
tuted no offense . . . .”).
282. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661B-1(b)(1), (2) (West 2019) (“the petitioner
was actually innocent of the crimes for which the petitioner was convicted”); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-702(g)(3) (West 2014) (“the petitioner is innocent of the
offenses charged . . . or his acts or omissions charged . . . did not constitute a
felony or misdemeanor against the State”); Ind. House Enrolled Act No. 1150
§ (2)(1) (2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-23 (West 2019) (“did not commit the of-
fense”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(2) (West 2019) (“the offense for which the indi-
vidual was convicted . . . was not committed by the individual [or] . . . the offense
. . . was not committed by any person, including the individual.”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-5004(c)(1)(C) (West 2018) (“the claimant did not commit the crime or
crimes for which the claimant was convicted . . . .”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 572.8(B)
(2012) (“the petitioner did not commit the crime for which he was convicted and
incarcerated nor did he commit any crime based upon the same set of facts used
in his original conviction.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 258D § 1(C)(vi) (West 2018)
(“he did not commit the crime or crimes charged . . . or any other felony arising
out of or reasonably connected to the facts supporting the indictment or com-
plaint, or any lesser included felony”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8241 (2)(D) (2019)
(“the person is innocent of the crime for which the person was convicted”); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 590.11(3)(b) (West 2014) (“a crime was not committed or . . . the
crime was not committed by the petitioner”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(II)
(2018) (“when a person is found to be innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(b) (West 2013) (“He did not commit the
crime for which he was convicted”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84(a) (West 2010)
(“the crime was not committed at all [or] . . . the crime was not committed by the
claimant, or . . . the claimant was determined to be innocent of all charges by a
three-judge panel under G.S. 15A-1469 . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019) (“the offense of which the individual was found guilty
. . . was not committed by the individual or . . . no offense was committed by any
person”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(e) (West 2019) (“the offense for
which the individual was convicted . . . was not committed by the individual”);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (West 2019) (“any person whom the governor finds
did not commit the crime for which the person was convicted”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
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ensure eligibility for recovery when failed self-defense wrongful con-
victions are at issue, as in Nebraska.283
Even if individuals who were wrongfully convicted and incarcer-
ated in failed self-defense cases meet basic eligibility requirements,
they may find it difficult to prevail on their compensation claims.
Compensation statutes demand more than a showing that claimants
succeeded in having their convictions invalidated and were subse-
quently exonerated by acquittal on retrial, by having the original
charges dismissed, or by pardon. They must also affirmatively demon-
strate their actual innocence, typically by clear and convincing evi-
dence.284 The gap between reasonable doubt and actual innocence
may be especially difficult to close when affirmative defenses are at
issue. Failed self-defense claims rarely involve erroneous identifica-
tions, forensic errors, rejected alibi offenses, or other essentially objec-
tive evidentiary factors that typically contribute to wrongful
convictions. They depend to a greater extent on more elusive, rela-
tively subjective factors such as whether the accused acted with the
reasonable belief that he or she was at imminent risk of harm.285
Which way this elusiveness should tip the scales may be debatable,
although there is little reason to favor crediting the initial decision
rejecting the defense, made at an error-plagued trial, over the later
decision to accept it.
Establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the use of force
to defend oneself was justifiable may be quite difficult. For instance,
the compensation claim made under New York’s statute by Lydia
Salce, one of the individuals in our sample of failed self-defense
wrongful convictions,286 was rejected by the New York Court of
Claims. After undertaking an extensive review of the proof presented
at Salce’s retrial, where she was acquitted by reason of self-defense,
the court concluded that she “failed to establish her innocence by clear
and convincing evidence. As a result, the claim is dismissed.”287
Salce’s two and one-half years of incarceration following her original,
invalidated conviction for attempted murder thus went
uncompensated.
13, § 5574(a)(3) (West 2019) (“he or she did not engage in any illegal conduct
alleged in the charging documents for which he or she was charged, convicted,
and imprisoned”).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 259–71.
284. See Compensation Chart by State—22 May 2018, supra note 259.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 20–28.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 136–41.
287. Salce v. State, No. 2018-015-130, Claim No.126391 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2018), http://ver
tumnus.courts.state.ny.us/claims/search/display.html?terms=Salce&url=/claims/
html/2018-015-130.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5L6F-P9TP] (last visited June
13, 2019).
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Whether compensation should be provided to individuals who were
convicted and incarcerated after their affirmative excuse defenses
were erroneously rejected raises different considerations than com-
pensation claims that are based on failed justification defenses. People
justified in acting as they did made the right choice, conducting them-
selves in a manner that society approved and would approve again
under similar circumstances. In contrast, the choices made by individ-
uals who are excused from criminal responsibility are unambiguously
wrong. Punishment is not imposed only because such persons are not
blameworthy because of a compromised cognitive or volitional
condition.288
It seems manifestly unjust to deny compensation to one wrongly
imprisoned for defending against a potentially lethal criminal assault.
The equities are different when it is determined, for example, that An-
drea Yates, who drowned her five children,289 or Erwin Charles Si-
mants, who shot and killed six family members,290 were erroneously
imprisoned after their meritorious insanity defenses were rejected. It
feels wrong, somehow, to raise the question of monetary compensation
for individuals who committed such horrifying acts. The courts have
not been receptive to compensation claims stemming from wrongful
convictions occasioned by erroneously rejected insanity defenses.291
288. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 186–207.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 171–85.
291. See Ebberts v. State Bd. of Control, 148 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (The
court rejected a claim for compensation brought under CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900
et seq. by Ebberts. Ebberts spent more than a year in prison after being convicted
of burglary when a jury rejected his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. He
then gained a retrial on the issue of insanity and was found not guilty by reason
of insanity. In California, trials involving the insanity defense are bifurcated,
with the first phase of the trial adjudicating guilt, and the second phase deciding
whether the defendant was insane at the time of committing the acts. The court
interpreted the compensation statute’s requirement of proof of “innocence” to
mean that the claimant “did not do the acts which characterize the crime . . . .
Ebberts did not contend . . . that he did not commit the acts which are elements of
the crime. The plea of insanity is a plea of confession and avoidance and as such
is a defense . . . . If the Legislature intended to include a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity (after a finding of guilt as to the commission of the offense
itself) under the circumstances of a retrial” it would have amended the statute,
the court reasoned, but it had not done so. Ebberts, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 546–47
(emphasis in original)); Diola v. Bd. of Control, 185 Cal. Rptr. 511, 515–16 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982) (distinguishing claim for compensation for wrongful conviction
and incarceration following failed self-defense claim following erroneous rejection
of insanity defense); Munroe v. State, 25 Ill. Ct. Cl. 286, 1966 WL 6276 (1966)
(The court rejected Munroe’s claim for compensation for wrongful conviction and
incarceration, in which he sought damages for twenty-two years he spent in
prison after being convicted of a 1936 murder. That conviction was reversed in
1958, and the following year Munroe was found not guilty by reason of insanity
for the original, charged offense. He then was released from custody and later
sought compensation under the state’s Court of Claims Act, with its requirement
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Perhaps these decisions seem right because it is so difficult to con-
sider awarding damages to people like Yates and Simants, whose acts
were so wrong. At the same time, there lingers a nagging illogic in
automatically denying compensation in all such cases, where the same
legal system that acknowledged the legitimacy of a criminal defense
erred in refusing to credit it, thus punishing a person racked by
mental illness when no punishment was deserved. Unlike Yates and
Simants, most individuals who invoke the insanity defense have not
been accused of murder, and a healthy number have not been charged
with crimes of violence.292 Cast in this light, it is at the very least
debatable whether compensation should in all cases be unavailable to
individuals who were subjected to punitive incarceration rather than
treated for their debilitating mental illness, as would have followed
had they been found not guilty by reason of insanity and civilly
committed.
Whether compensation should be denied in cases of wrongful con-
viction resulting from failed excuse defenses other than insanity is
similarly debatable. Consider Yun Hseng Liao’s conviction and impris-
onment for attempted murder when, if the later developments in his
case are credited, he lacked criminal responsibility because a sleep-
walking disorder was not effectively diagnosed nor substantiated at
his trial owing to a combination of errors by a clerk of court and his
lawyer.293 Is labeling somnambulism as an excuse sufficient explana-
tion for denying him monetary compensation for twelve years of lost
liberty that presumably should never have happened? Similar ques-
that he prove his “innocence” and “that the act for which he was wrongfully im-
prisoned was not committed by him.” The court concluded that “the legislature
intended only to provide a manner of recourse in the Court of Claims . . . for those
who were imprisoned for an act, which they did not commit. The legislature did
not intend to establish a means of recourse for an individual who in ‘fact’ had
committed a criminal act, but an act for which one could not be held ‘criminally’
responsible due to a mental condition.” Id. at 290–91). See also Walden v. State,
547 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ohio 1989) (authorizing claim for compensation for wrong-
ful conviction and imprisonment under Ohio law following rejected claim of self-
defense, while noting: “The state’s final contention is that compensation of per-
sons acquitted by reason of self-defense will open the public coffers to claims by
persons acquitted by reason of insanity, entrapment or other affirmative de-
fenses. Those questions are not before us . . . . We express no opinion as to the
eligibility of persons acquitted by reason of other affirmative defenses.”). See gen-
erally Annotation, Construction and Application of State Statutes Providing Com-
pensation for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration, 53 A.L.R. 6th 305, § 24
(2010 & Supp.).
292. Eric Silver, Carmen Cirincione & Henry J. Steadman, Demythologizing Inaccu-
rate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 66–67 (1994)
(after studying the use of the insanity defense in eight states between 1976 and
1985, the authors reported that 14.3% of defendants pleading not guilty by rea-
son of insanity had been charged with murder, 54.1% were charged with other
violent offenses, and 31.6% were charged with nonviolent crimes).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 160–70.
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tions could be raised in cases involving the erroneous rejection of de-
fenses of duress, infancy, or other types of excuses. At a minimum,
legislative policy should explicitly address whether individuals whose
wrongful convictions and incarceration result from the erroneous re-
jection of excuse defenses should in all cases, and for all such defenses,
be barred from receiving compensation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law’s recognition of affirmative defenses to charged crimes is
an affirmation that condemnation and punishment are unwarranted
because of the circumstances confronting individuals in exceptional
cases. Convictions resulting from the erroneous rejection of affirma-
tive defenses are indeed wrongful, and arguably even more profoundly
wrong than the more typical “wrong person” and other varieties of “no
crime” wrongful convictions. Individuals whose otherwise criminal
conduct is justified or excused by law do not ask to be put in a position
to have to defend themselves from a violent unlawful assailant, for
example, nor do they invite the mental illness that absolves them from
blame under the terms of an insanity defense. In this sense, individu-
als whose affirmative defenses are erroneously rejected in criminal
cases are doubly-damned, first by the unwanted circumstances precip-
itating their conduct, and subsequently by the legal system which
wrongly convicted and punished them.
These sentiments are not simply bromides nor mere abstractions.
Real people, some of whose cases are described in this article, pain-
fully suffered these dual indignities. Their erroneous convictions oc-
curred for various reasons, some rooted in trial-specific problems,
others more closely associated with general doctrinal precepts and
rules of procedure, and some essentially owing to chance circum-
stances beyond anyone’s control. Although most jurisdictions now
have statutes authorizing compensation for incarceration resulting
from wrongful convictions, individuals whose convictions and impris-
onment resulted from the erroneous rejection of affirmative defenses
may have unusual difficulty in establishing their entitlement to an
award. Others may be told that they need not even apply because they
are flatly ineligible.
The law quite correctly acknowledges that criminal conviction and
punishment are not deserved under the circumstances giving rise to
affirmative defenses. When meritorious affirmative defenses are re-
jected, and the individuals who were entitled by law to rely on them
are convicted of crimes and punished, justice has indeed miscarried.
Wrongful convictions and punishment are wrongful. They are no less
wrongful when they occur following the erroneous rejection of an af-
firmative defense than when they follow a straightforward plea of not
guilty. The unfortunate individuals who have been convicted and pun-
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ished although their conduct was justified or excused by law have suf-
fered multiple indignities. They should not be considered somehow
less worthy or less deserving because circumstances beyond their con-
trol caused them to act as they did, then raise an affirmative defense
to a charged crime, only to erroneously be denied the law’s protection.
